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ARTICLES

PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
by
Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer
Our aim in this Article is to advance understanding of private
enforcement of statutory and administrative law in the United States
and to raise questions that will be useful to those who are concerned with
regulatory design in other countries. To that end, we briefly discuss
aspects of American culture, history, and political institutions that
reasonably can be thought to have contributed to the growth and
subsequent development of private enforcement. We also set forth key
elements of the general legal landscape in which decisions about private
enforcement are made, aspects of which should be central to the choice of
an enforcement strategy and, in the case of private enforcement, are
critical to the efficacy of a private enforcement regime. We then turn to
the business of institutional architecture, describing the considerations—
both in favor of and against private enforcement—that should affect the
choice of an enforcement strategy. We lay out choices to be made about
elements of a private enforcement regime, attending to the general legal
landscape in which the regime would operate, particularly court access,
as well as how incentives for enforcement interact with the market for
legal services, which has important implications for private enforcement
activity. We situate these legislative choices about private enforcement in
the context of institutions that shape them. Finally, we seek to
Burbank is the David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School. Farhang is Associate Professor of Political
Science and Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley. Kritzer holds the
Marvin J. Sonosky Chair of Law and Public Policy at the University of Minnesota Law
School. The authors would like to thank Joshua Koppel, Penn Law Class of 2012, for
excellent research assistance. Stephen Meili and Prentiss Cox provided comments
and helpful suggestions regarding the section on consumer protection; Joshua
Wright generously made available data on consumer protection laws collected by the
Searle Center. This Article is a revised version of part of a longer comparative paper
that was prepared for the XIVth World Congress of the International Association of
Procedural Law.
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demonstrate how general considerations play out by examining private
enforcement in two policy areas: legislation proscribing discrimination in
employment, and laws protecting consumers from unfair and deceptive
practices.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Our aim in this Article is to advance understanding of private
enforcement of statutory and administrative law. Long part of American
legal culture, private enforcement has in recent years attracted
considerable interest and provoked considerable controversy abroad. For
example, it appears that an impetus for the attention that some countries
have recently given to representative litigation has been EU directives
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requiring that member states provide “adequate and effective means” to
1
protect consumers. For that reason, we also seek to raise questions that
will be useful to those who are concerned with regulatory design in other
2
legal systems.
There have been deep differences between the civil law and
common law worlds about the feasibility and utility of attempting to
define the attributes and proper roles of public or private actors in the
3
legal system. For those who believe that “wrongs to individuals are
properly within the domain of private liability, wrongs to the general
public are properly brought only by public officials. . . . the phrase
‘private attorney general’ is not just an oxymoron; it is virtually a logical
4
impossibility.” Among those not troubled by such matters of first
principle, including most Americans, the term nevertheless may have
quite different connotations. Thus, one scholar objected to its use to
describe plaintiffs in so-called citizen-suit litigation under federal
5
environmental laws. Yet, at least under some of those laws the
tenuousness of allegations of individualized injury would seem to make
the term least problematic because “[g]reater deterrence was no longer a
6
collateral benefit but became the primary benefit.”
Although we acknowledge some inevitable definitional issues, in this
Article we focus on situations in which government responds to a
perception of unremedied systemic problems by creating or modifying a

1

See Christopher Hodges, The Reform of Class and Representative
Actions in European Legal Systems: A New Framework for Collective Redress
in Europe 103 (2008). See also Till Schreiber, Private Antitrust Litigation in the European
Union, 44 Int’l Law. 1157, 1158 (2010) (describing EU Commission activity “clearly
indicat[ing] that the legal and economic landscape of actions for damages resulting
from the violation of E.U. antitrust law is currently changing to the benefit of victims
of antitrust infringements”).
2
We use the phrase “private enforcement” for both enforcement initiated by
private parties but taken over by public officials as well as enforcement initiated and
prosecuted by private parties. We use the phrase “private enforcement regime” to
refer to the system of rules that a legislature includes in its statutory design after
deciding to include a private right of action. These rules may address such diverse
subjects as “who has standing to sue, which parties will bear the costs of litigation,
what damages will be available to winning plaintiffs, whether a judge or jury will make
factual determinations and assess damages, and rules of liability, evidence, and proof
that together can have profound consequences for how much or little private
enforcement litigation will actually be mobilized.” Sean Farhang, The Litigation
State: Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the U.S. 3–4 (2010).
3
See John Henry Merryman, The Public Law–Private Law Distinction in European
and American Law, 17 J. Pub. L. 3, 3–4 (1968).
4
Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary
Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 Buff. L. Rev. 833, 940
(1985).
5
See Stephen M. Johnson, Private Plaintiffs, Public Rights: Article II and Environmental
Citizen Suits, 49 U. Kan. L. Rev. 383, 409, 421 (2001).
6
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000
U. Ill. L. Rev. 185, 198 (2000).
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regulatory regime and relying in whole or in part on private actors as
enforcers. We are not concerned about alternative regulatory choices
that a government sincere about seeking to solve unremedied systemic
7
problems might have made, whether by manipulating incentives in
order to shape decentralized individual decisions, as through the tax
system, or by deploying a form of command-and-control regulation that
did not include privately-initiated proceedings.
We consider the typical origins of and processes characterizing
8
private enforcement regimes, as well as aspects of the broader social,
political, and legal landscapes that might be thought to influence those
origins and processes. Believing that “abstract speculation on the
functioning or desirability of [private enforcement] will get us
9
nowhere,” we explore the social and political character of private
enforcement, along with the doctrine that underlies it, disciplining
normative analysis with the fruits of social science.
The desire to avoid “abstract speculation” is one reason we take a
sectoral approach, choosing two areas to study from a much longer list of
legal domains in which private enforcement plays a role. In addition,
the desirability of authorizing private actions involves difficult
policy judgments and is likely to depend on a number of contextspecific factors [with the result that] [m]aking such determinations
therefore requires familiarity with the nature of the particular
policy problem, the substantive goals of the regulatory scheme, and
the likely interaction of private lawsuits with other elements of the
10
government’s enforcement strategy.
This helps to explain our view, discussed further below, that class action
(or other representative litigation) mechanisms should not be designed

7

Continued reliance on the market (ignoring market failure) or intentional
creation of an impotent private enforcement regime would not be a viable option for
a government “sincere about seeking to solve” such problems. Compare the history of
federal employment discrimination legislation. Republican members of the Senate
favored private enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 precisely because they
believed that it would be less robust than administrative enforcement. See Farhang,
supra note 2, at 94–128.
8
See Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or
Administrative Process?, 39 Pub. Choice 33, 36 (1982).
9
Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 4, at 964.
10
Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for
Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 Va. L. Rev. 93, 106 (2005). Moreover,
in order to assess private enforcement, “it is necessary to understand the social
dynamics that surround a particular field of regulation, as well as the ways in which
the entry of private enforcers is likely to alter those relationships.” Boyer &
Meidinger, supra note 4, at 889. See also J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private
Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1137, 1176 (2012)
(“Rigorous analysis of the role private enforcement mechanisms play in a given
regulatory regime has been obscured both in doctrine and in scholarship by the
tendency to formulate acontextual, abstract metrics for the evaluation of such
mechanisms. . . .”).
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or deployed for that purpose on a general (trans-substantive) basis, an
approach that necessarily neglects the different regulatory policies and
11
goals of different bodies of substantive law. Although we concentrate on
federal law, state law plays the dominant role in one of the two sectors we
have chosen to study in detail.
When private actors are given access to courts for enforcement, we
think it important not to conceive of or describe the phenomenon as
12
13
“judicial enforcement,” or “judicial intervention.” Like exclusive focus
on formal legal rules, such a frame can obscure the locus of initiation—
clients and lawyers—and the impact of incentives on the prospects for
initiation. As a result, it may be more difficult to discern what aspects of
regulatory design affect the efficacy and durability of the policy sought to
14
be implemented. Our interest in private enforcement is not confined to
courts, however; it extends to administrative agencies and other
tribunals. Many kinds of actions that are brought in civil courts in the
15
United States are also brought in separate tribunals abroad.
Finally, although a government sincere about seeking to solve
unremedied systemic problems would not intentionally create an
impotent private enforcement regime, the experience of countries that
have introduced class action litigation without attending to the incentive
structure that drives litigation—creating “beautiful cars without
16
17
engines” —suggests that impotence need not be purposeful. It also

11

See Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed
Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. Rev. 17, 74–75 (2010); Glover, supra note
10, at 1186.
12
Robert Belton, A Comparative Review of Public and Private Enforcement of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 Vand. L. Rev. 905, 922 (1978); Fiorina, supra note 8,
at 43.
13
Alexandra Kalev & Frank Dobbin, Enforcement of Civil Rights Law in Private
Workplaces: The Effects of Compliance Reviews and Lawsuits Over Time, 31 Law & Soc.
Inquiry 855, 891 (2006). But cf. Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 Minn.
L. Rev. 782, 784 (2011) (discussing incentives and ability of judiciary to thwart private
enforcement). See infra text accompanying note 247 (same).
14
See Sean Farhang, Congressional Mobilization of Private Litigants: Evidence from the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 6 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 1, 1 (2009). This is not to deny
that the locus of enforcement in courts rather than, for instance, administrative
agencies may in some jurisdictions implicate a “fundamental debate about the role of
the courts in policy making in a representative democracy.” Deborah R. Hensler, The
Globalization of Class Actions: An Overview, 622 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc Sci. 7, 26
(2009). Thus, as to class actions—Professor Hensler’s concern—one might feel
differently depending on whether decisions concerning representative litigation were
made on a sector-by-sector basis by the legislature or on a general (trans-substantive)
basis by court rule.
15
See, e.g., Richard Moorhead, An American Future? Contingency Fees, Claims
Explosions and Evidence from Employment Tribunals, 73 Mod. L. Rev. 752, 752–54 (2010).
16
Filippo Valguarnera, Legal Tradition as an Obstacle: Europe’s Difficult Journey to
Class Action, 10 Global Jurist (Advances) 1, 42 (2010). Consider in that regard an
assessment of the EU Commission’s 2008 White Paper on Damages Actions for
Breach of the European Commission Antitrust Rules: “If European courts chase the
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confirms that an evaluation of private enforcement, whether in theory or
practice, will be useless unless it comprehends the general and specific
legal institutions and rules that constitute a private enforcement regime
and that, in combination with other social, economic, and cultural
influences, determine whether a government sincere about seeking to
solve unremedied systemic problems can be successful.
We start with a brief discussion of aspects of American culture,
American history, and American political institutions that may have
contributed to the growth and subsequent development of private
enforcement. We then turn to the general legal landscape in which
decisions about private enforcement play out, aspects of which should be
central to the choice of an enforcement strategy and, in the case of
private enforcement, are critical to the efficacy of a private enforcement
regime. Careful attention must be paid to rules on the allocation of costs
and fees. Even seemingly technical rules on pleading or discovery may
18
impede access or effective enforcement.
We then turn to the business of institutional architecture: designing
an enforcement regime. Once a government that is sincere about seeking
to solve an unremedied systemic problem has decided to do so through
command-and-control regulation, what are the advantages and
disadvantages of public and private enforcement that might affect
choices between them (including the choice of a hybrid strategy)? On
the assumption that government has selected private enforcement (or a

harm downstream to the ultimately injured party, they will find themselves with
thousands or even millions of parties to compensate in the ordinary antitrust case.
Not only will those parties be widely dispersed with many small injuries, they will also
be denied the two features of the U.S. system—generous claim aggregation and
treble damages—that provide the best opportunity for a suit to be brought and
monies recovered. Further, if the purchasers sue, they will face sharp limitations on
discovery. Discovery stinginess is particularly problematic in a system that gives
standing to downstream purchasers who are remote from the defendant.” Daniel A.
Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 675, 701–02 (2010).
See also Reza Rajabiun, Private Enforcement and Judicial Discretion in the Evolution of
Antitrust in the United States, 8 J. Competition L. & Econ. 187, 202 (2012) (“The early
history of the U.S. antitrust system and the more recent experience in the European
Union illustrate that formal rights of standing do not always translate into an effective
litigation regime.”).
17
See Hensler, supra note 14, at 22–25.
18
See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure,
93 Judicature 109, 120 (2009). Realists cringed when the Supreme Court treated the
federal class action rule as just another joinder provision—like a rule that permits two
passengers injured in the same automobile accident to bring one lawsuit against the
driver—whose effect on substantive rights is “incidental.” See Burbank & Wolff, supra
note 11, at 65. The case in question, Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010), usefully reminds us, however, what a wild card the
modern class action (dating to 1966) has been in the history of private enforcement.
It also raises related questions about the wisdom of a general (trans-substantive) class
action rule and the proper institution to decide whether the class action should serve
as an enabler of private enforcement.
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hybrid strategy), we take up choices to be made about elements of a
private enforcement regime. This part of creating an effective
enforcement strategy is considerably more complex than may first
appear, requiring careful attention to the general legal landscape in
which the regime would operate, including existing formal rules
concerning court access, and to the market for legal services. Questions
of institutional structure loom over both the choice of an enforcement
strategy and structuring a private enforcement regime. There is robust
quantitative and qualitative evidence that the structure of American
government and, in particular, the dynamics of a separation-of-powers
system have strongly influenced resort to private enforcement regimes in
19
connection with federal regulatory legislation.
In the penultimate part of this Article, we examine how general
considerations play out—how they change shape and salience—because
of the dynamics of particular legal contexts. For that purpose we have
chosen two quite different examples of regulatory response to the
perception of unremedied systemic problems. First, we take up modern
legislation proscribing discrimination in employment. Here we have the
benefit of extensive quantitative and qualitative social science research to
help discipline normative thinking. Second, we examine modern
regulatory responses to the problem of consumer protection against
unfair and deceptive practices. Whereas federal law has played an
important role in regulating employment discrimination—even if not as
20
important as generally assumed —state law unquestionably has been the
dominant vehicle of private enforcement, if not the dominant regulatory
force, in the consumer protection field. This makes our job more
difficult. Yet, the growing importance of a quasi-federalist structure in
Europe through the EU may make the effort worthwhile for those
contemplating private enforcement in that rapidly evolving landscape.
II. General Historical, Cultural, and Political Influences on
Private Enforcement
For most of its history, by reason of the circumstances of its
founding, the United States has depended far more on state and local
laws and institutions than it has on federal laws and institutions for
solutions to systemic problems unremedied by judge-made common law
rules applied in actions between private parties. States have historically

19

See Thomas F. Burke, Lawyers, Lawsuits, and Legal Rights: The Battle
over Litigation in American Society 13–14 (2002); Farhang, supra note 2, at 31–
34. In addition to discussing how these elements of structure have influenced design
choices in the United States, in the Conclusion we raise questions about the
implications of other government structures for private enforcement.
20
See Gary Blasi & Joseph W. Doherty, California Employment Discrimination Law
and its Enforcement: The Fair Employment and Housing Act at 50, Center for Law &
Public Policy 62 (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/paper=1596906.
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had primary or exclusive responsibility for the maintenance of order, the
protection of public welfare, and the provision of government services.
Moreover, although disagreements about the need for and permissible
extent of national governmental institutions have existed since the
founding, the federal Constitution reflects a preference for both limited
government and decentralized government with regard to internal
affairs.
There have been at least four periods in U.S. history when federal
laws and institutions made notable encroachments on a landscape
previously either free of legal regulation by statutory or administrative
law or dominated by state institutions: (1) during and immediately after
the Civil War in the 1860s, (2) during the Progressive Era that bridged
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, (3) during the Great Depression
in the 1930s, and (4) during and following the Civil Rights and “Great
Society” period in the 1960s. Despite enormous increases in federal
regulation since the 1960s, the states of the United States continue to
21
guard their prerogatives, even if inconsistently, and it remains true that
most law governing citizen-to-citizen relationships is state law and much
of that is judge-made common law.
Each of these periods saw increases in both the amount of federal
statutory and administrative law and in the federal government’s reliance
on private enforcement. For cases brought by private plaintiffs, various
federal statutes contained either (1) a fee-shifting provision or (2)
authority to award multiple or punitive damages, or both. There were
three such statutes from 1887 through 1899, eight from 1900 through
1929, seven from 1930 through 1939, four from 1940 through 1949, six
from 1950 through 1959, ten from 1960 (1964) through 1969, and sixty
22
from 1970 through 1979. In some cases, a single statute might contain
23
multiple private enforcement regimes. For some of this period,
increasing resort to private enforcement regimes may have reflected, in
part, the slow growth of federal administrative capacity.
21
Those whose parents or grandparents were helped by Social Security or nursed
back to health courtesy of Medicare manifest the same sort of inconsistency when
protesting health care reform as do their elected representatives. “They want and
expect guaranteed health care and financial aid when disability, disaster, or
unemployment strikes their families. But getting those things from an institutionally
fragmented, tax-averse, ‘anti-statist’ political system, as in the United States, presents a
problem.” Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law 15
(2001). The same “antistatist sentiments” underlie the tendency of many Americans
to explain “business practices that are driven by public policy as driven by market
forces. . . . [a tendency] to underestimate the importance of policy in part because
the federal government appears to be weak.” Erin Kelly & Frank Dobbin, Civil Rights
Law at Work: Sex Discrimination and the Rise of Maternity Leave Policies, 105 Am. J. Soc.
455, 457 (1999).
22
See generally Farhang, supra note 2, at 64–66.
23
For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has separate and distinct
enforcement provisions for the public accommodations title and the employment
title, both of which include private enforcement. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
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Although federal administration is not as much a development of
24
the twentieth century as has often been portrayed,
the absence of an autonomous federal bureaucracy in nineteenthcentury U.S. democracy allowed patronage-wielding political parties
to colonize administrative arrangements in [this country], thereby
determining that voters would be wooed with nonprogrammatic
appeals, especially with patronage and other “distributive” allocations
25
of publicly controlled resources.
As late as 1941, prominent scholars noted that “an administrative
body does not normally act to remedy wrongs which have occurred. . . .
[and that this] power of administrative bodies, to act affirmatively after
26
the injury, is still in the tentative stage. . . .” These scholars also pointed
out that “there are, of course, many fields in which administrative bodies
27
have not made an appearance” and that “to impose upon public
agencies the task of asserting civil sanctions on behalf of injured groups
28
will require a substantial increase in size, personnel and expenditures.”
They were skeptical about the prospects of that happening because,
“[d]espite the great improvements in federal agencies in recent years, it
is still true that there is no tradition of public service and little
29
development of a true civil servant attitude in America.”
Government institutions are a reflection of the preferences of those
who fashion them. In this country certain attitudes have been quite
tenacious over time. These attitudes include self-reliance, belief in the
virtues of free market capitalism, impatience with the status quo, and
distrust of government. Distrust of government and bureaucratic
authority, manifested in part by antagonism towards taxes, is an
important part of the phenomenon of “adversarial legalism” that Robert
Kagan believes helps explain the prominent role that privately-initiated
litigation plays in American enforcement of statutory and administrative
30
law. He argues that “[o]rganizationally, adversarial legalism typically is
associated with and is embedded in decisionmaking institutions in which
authority is fragmented and in which hierarchical control is relatively
31
weak.” Privately-initiated litigation satisfies the impulse in favor of
decentralized regulation, and even though the federal and state
governments substantially subsidize civil courts, the system is likely

24

See Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded
Age, 119 Yale L.J. 1362, 1365–66 (2010).
25
Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current
Research, in Bringing the State Back In 3, 24 (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1985).
26
Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class
Suit, 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684, 687 (1941).
27
Id.
28
Id. at 720.
29
Id. at 720–21.
30
Kagan, supra note 21, at 15–16.
31
Id. at 9 (emphasis omitted).
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cheaper for the state, and hence for the taxpayers (at least those looking
only at their tax bills) than exclusive reliance on centralized (stateinitiated) enforcement would be.
Cultural explanations, often emphasizing a litigious populace, an
imperial judiciary, and an entrepreneurial bar, dominate discussions of
the role of litigation in American society. Kagan is correct, however, that
“adversarial legalism in the United States does not arise from a deep32
rooted American propensity to bring lawsuits.” Notwithstanding a
decades-long organized campaign by American business to demonize
lawyers and litigation, there is robust empirical evidence supporting
Kagan’s observation that “[m]any, perhaps most, Americans are reluctant
33
to sue . . . .” Moreover, subsequent work in political science, discussed
below, both confirms and extends his alternative explanation, namely
that “American adversarial legalism arises from political traditions and
legal arrangements that provide incentives to resort to adversarial legal
34
weapons,” making clear the centrality of purposefully designed private
enforcement regimes to the increase of adversarial legalism. This work
demonstrates that cultural explanations of private enforcement
drastically oversimplify and that institutional considerations have been
consequential.
In recently published work, Sean Farhang uses both statistical
analysis of systematically collected data and qualitative empirical work
focusing on federal civil rights legislation to show that the choice of
private enforcement as opposed (or in addition) to administrative
enforcement by the federal government tends to reflect concern in the
dominant party in Congress about subversion of legislative preferences if
enforcement were committed to an administrative agency under the
35
control of an ideologically distant executive. In a complex system of
separated but interdependent governmental powers, it is as difficult to
repeal as to enact legislation. Where, therefore, the status quo is “sticky,”
the choice of private over administrative enforcement may afford

32

Id. at 34.
Id. Although Kagan’s 2001 book emphasized the problematic aspects of
adversarial legalism, he has also acknowledged its strengths, “I also indicate that if
adversarial legalism were by some miracle to be drastically eliminated in the United
States, without also instituting major changes in other aspects of American law and
public administration, then injustice almost surely would grow. Adversarial legalism
fills a void in American governance. In a structurally fragmented, deadlock-prone,
and often underfunded governmental system, adversarial legalism provides an
essential way of elaborating and enforcing important norms of due process, equal
treatment, and protection from harm. The United States lacks the highly
professional, hierarchically supervised national bureaucracies, social welfare systems,
and corporatist arrangements that characterize western European governments.”
Robert A. Kagan, On Surveying the Whole Legal Forest, 28 Law & Soc. Inquiry 833, 859
(2003) (emphasis omitted).
34
Kagan, supra note 21, at 34.
35
See Farhang, supra note 2, at 76–78.
33
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protection to congressional policy long after the governing majority has
been replaced by legislators with different preferences. Moreover,
because private enforcement regimes create incentives for lawyers and
litigants—again, “judicial enforcement” is a misnomer—they also provide
some protection against subversion by an ideologically distant judiciary
(in a system in which judges are politically appointed). Thus, as Farhang
predicted, federal statutory private enforcement regimes are associated
with periods of divided government, and the great majority of them
endure through periods of control by the party that was in the minority
36
when they were enacted.
Although cultural explanations of adversarial legalism oversimplify,
there is certainly a historic willingness of Americans, self-reliant and
insistent on their rights, to take their grievances to court. Until the
Progressive Era, however, there was virtually no federal statutory or
administrative law available to solve unremedied systemic problems
through private enforcement, and although the New Deal added to that
store considerably, a variety of legal barriers hindered access to court. As
we discuss below, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure eliminated or
lowered a number of those barriers. Litigation of consequence requires
lawyers and thus financing, however, and those who can afford to litigate
may not be the people most intent on righting the wrongs of society.
The vast increase in private enforcement actions under federal law
that started in the late 1960s reflected in large part the congruence of
three developments: (1) the enactment of many new federal statutes
specifically authorizing (or interpreted to authorize) private rights of
action, (2) the proliferation of means to finance private enforcement
litigation, including Legal Services programs funded by the government,
the growth of privately funded nonprofit advocacy organizations
subvened through favorable tax treatment, particularly in the civil rights
37
and environmental fields, damages provisions sufficient to attract
lawyers relying on contingency fee agreements, statutory attorneys’ feeshifting provisions favorable to prevailing plaintiffs, and the modern class
action (which, as we discuss below, dramatically enlarged the scope for
contingent financing), and (3) changes in the legal profession, attracted
by these new opportunities to do well, sometimes by doing good, and
freed of some of the most seriously anti-competitive aspects of self38
regulation (i.e., a ban on advertising). Much of the impetus for these
developments came from the political dominance of the Democratic
Party during the 1960s.
A great deal has changed since these developments promoted
private enforcement in the United States. In a recent article about the
demand for and supply of legal services, Gillian Hadfield observes that,

36
37
38

See id. at 166.
See Belton, supra note 12, at 922–31; Thompson, supra note 6, at 216–17.
See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 353, 384 (1977).
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the vast majority of the legal problems faced by (particularly poor)
Americans fall outside of the “rule of law,” with high proportions of
people—many more than in the U.K., for example—simply
accepting a result determined not by law but by the play of markets,
power, organizations, wealth, politics, and other dynamics in our
39
complex society.

To the extent that Hadfield’s findings apply to private enforcement,
it may be important to consider how, notwithstanding the “stickiness of
the status quo,” those with the power to determine the efficacy of private
enforcement regimes in action may subvert the policy preferences of the
enacting Congress. As we shall discuss, two related means are
underfunding of the courts and judicial actions, often under cover of
resource constraints, that compromise steps previously taken to afford
effective access to court.
III. The General Legal Landscape
A society’s general legal landscape is relevant to the choice of an
enforcement strategy and may be critical to the efficacy of a private
enforcement regime. Rules about costs and funding for litigation, the
procedures provided for the initiation and conduct of litigation, and the
lawmaking powers of the judiciary—all should be considered by those
responsible for regulatory policy. If the decision is made to pursue a
private enforcement or a hybrid strategy, careful attention should be
given to the question whether achievement of the regulatory goal
requires changes in the generally applicable arrangements.
A. Costs and Funding
1. Court Costs
Civil court systems are funded primarily by the political units of
which they are a part, federal and state. Although filing fees are imposed,
they tend to be small. In the federal courts, for example, the filing fee at
the trial court (first instance) level is $350, and the filing fee for a first

39
Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative Assessment of the
Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 Fordham Urb. L.J. 129, 143 (2010)
(footnote omitted). She goes on to note, “But is there a deeper threat to the structure
of a democratic society—especially one that purports to organize its relationships on
the basis of law and legality—suggested by the finding that Americans are far more
likely than those in the U.K. and Slovakia to ‘do nothing’ in response to the legally
cognizable difficulties they face? That they are far less likely to seek out others in their
community capable of helping them to align their experiences with those
contemplated by the laws and procedures that stack up in the voluminous legal
materials of regulation, case law, statutes, and constitutions? Is there a paradox
lurking here that in the system of adversarial legalism that Robert Kagan describes as
distinctive of the ‘American way of law’ (to be contrasted with the greater reliance on
bureaucratic means of policy making and implementation found in Europe) that law
is in practice less a salient part of everyday life in the U.S. than elsewhere?” Id.
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40

appeal is $450. Those who cannot afford to pay the filing fees may be
41
entitled to relief under provisions for in forma pauperis filings. Different
fee arrangements govern specialized courts, such as the bankruptcy
42
courts in the federal system.
Determining whether public funding of courts is adequate for their
needs is an extremely challenging enterprise. Although some scholars
43
have voiced skepticism that the federal courts are underfunded,
44
reliance for that purpose on docket statistics can be misleading. First,
caseloads vary across federal courts at both the trial and appellate levels,
and they also vary over time. Over the last few decades in some parts of
the country, docket pressures, particularly those caused by criminal
45
46
(often drug) cases, and more recently immigration cases, have made it
impossible for civil litigants to obtain a reasonably prompt trial date.
Owen Fiss has argued that in such situations the settlement of civil cases
may resemble plea bargaining in criminal cases and reflect not mutual
47
accord but capitulation to economic necessity.
Second, docket pressures have encouraged federal courts to adopt
measures that, although they may be celebrated on efficiency grounds,
may not give due weight in that calculus to the quality of justice. There is
reason to worry that the trends toward aggressive case management and
use of procedural filtering devices such as summary judgment and
48
dismissals on the pleadings have exacted a toll on democratic values. It
is unrealistic to believe that the enforcement slack created by procedural
belt-tightening measures that screen out meritorious and nonmeritorious cases alike will be taken up by better-funded public
enforcement.
Third, there is also reason to worry that, by creating an elaborate
system of pre-trial procedure that has been fashioned to address the
perceived problems of complex, high stakes, cases, and by insisting that
the same rules govern all civil cases in federal court, the responsible

40

United States Courts: Forms & Fees, http://www.uscourts.gov/
FormsAndFees/Fees.aspx (2011).
41
28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2006).
42
See United States Courts: Forms & Fees, supra note 40.
43
See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 459, 500–01 (2004).
44
See Stephen B. Burbank, Keeping Our Ambition Under Control: The Limits of Data
and Inference in Searching for the Causes and Consequences of Vanishing Trials in Federal
Court, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 571, 585–86 (2004).
45
Constitutional and statutory requirements providing for speedy trials may
force courts to give criminal cases precedence over civil cases.
46
See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1281, 1281–
82 (2010).
47
See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984).
48
See Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy:
Restoring a Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 399, 399–401 (2011); see
also Hazel Genn, Judging Civil Justice 174 (2010).
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lawmakers have made the federal courts unattractive to business and
inaccessible to the middle class—a very effective way to control the civil
49
docket.
Whatever one’s judgment about the adequacy of public funding of
the federal courts, the instances in recent decades when state court
systems have experienced funding emergencies are too numerous to
permit doubt that, viewed as a whole, the country’s commitment to
50
adequate funding of courts may reasonably be questioned.
2. Party Costs
As is well known, but for historical reasons that remain somewhat
51
obscure, it has long been the law in virtually every American court

49

The extent to which corporations favor arbitration over (federal) litigation for
the resolution of inter-corporate disputes is less clear than often asserted. See
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study
of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DePaul L.
Rev. 335, 335–36 (2007). It is clear, however, that many corporations have sought to
channel disputes with consumers into arbitration and to foreclose access to elements
of the private enforcement regimes, such as attorney fee shifting and representative
(class) proceedings, that would be available to them in civil courts. Government
reliance on, and enforcement under the Federal Arbitration Act of, private ordering
to create alternative dispute resolution processes to litigation, although characteristic
of some of the general aspects of American society discussed above, recalls Genn’s
reference to a “powerful meeting of minds [that] has developed between an
emerging profession of private dispute resolvers and judicial opinion formers which
perfectly suits the financial realities of a cash-strapped justice system struggling to
process a growing number of criminal defendants.” Genn, supra note 48, at 25.
Moreover, it may look less benign when considered in light of recent developments
in public enforcement in England and Wales and elsewhere in Europe. See Hodges,
supra note 1, at 103. This suggests again that distrust of bureaucratic authority may
blight the prospects of public enforcement as an alternative. It also suggests that
institutional architecture, tradition, and the interests of a self-regulating legal
profession may blight the prospects of non-administrative tribunals.
50
See ABA Coalition for Justice, Funding the Justice System: How Are the Courts
Funded? 4 (2009), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/abastore/productpage/
3460003PDF; Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Saving Civil Justice: Judging Civil Justice, 85
Tul. L. Rev. 247, 259 (2010) (reviewing Hazel Genn, Judging Civil Justice (2010)).
Recently published comparative data, although incomplete and in some respects
incommensurable, are pertinent to the question of adequate funding. In the study of
legal resources referred to above, Gillian Hadfield compiled data for the United
States and a selection of European countries that included both established and
emerging market democracies. She found that “U.S. public expenditure per capita on
courts, judges, prosecutors, and legal aid is the highest among this set of both
advanced and transitioning European countries.” Hadfield, supra note 39, at 149.
She also found, however, that “U.S. public expenditure per case . . . is significantly
lower than in other advanced democracies, when accounting for the apparently vastly
higher numbers of cases [than] in those countries . . . and comparable [to] or
higher than that spent in emerging market democracies that are still seeking to build
the rule of law in their countries.” Id.
51
See generally John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee
Recovery, 47 Law & Contemp. Probs. 9 (1984).
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52

system—Alaska is the exception —that each party is responsible for that
53
party’s attorneys’ fees—win or lose. In other words, the default rule for
attorneys’ fees is different from the rule that governs other party costs;
there is no presumptive shifting of (all or part of) the winner’s attorneys’
fees to the loser. This so-called “American Rule” has been the subject of
sustained theoretical study and very limited empirical study, usually with
the goal of seeking to adjudicate claims for superiority as between the
American Rule and the so-called “English Rule,” under which the loser
pays all or part of the winner’s attorneys’ fees and that, as has often been
remarked, would more accurately be called the “Most-of-the-World
54
Rule.”
The (law and) economics literature in this area, typically devoted to
the creation of highly stylized, necessarily parsimonious models, is
55
ambiguous on the comparative question. That said, since we seek to
identify what wise public policymakers would consider when choosing a
regulatory strategy and building a private enforcement regime, there may
be value in noting some of the conclusions of a recent review and
assessment of the theoretical and empirical literature:
[T]he current state of economic knowledge does not enable us
reliably to predict whether a move to fuller indemnification [i.e., in
the direction of the English Rule] would raise or lower the total
costs of litigation, let alone whether it would better align those costs
with any social benefits they might generate.
....
Fee shifting does appear to increase legal expenditures per case, in
some cases significantly. It also encourages parties with poorly

52
See Alaska Stat. § 09.60.010 (2012). In addition, Texas by statute has fee
shifting for a range of private law matters, including contracts, certain kinds of
property loss, claims for payment for services or labor, etc. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. § 38.001 (West 2005).
53
Courts will generally honor an otherwise valid contract that calls for fee
shifting in the event of a dispute that leads to litigation, making it appropriate to
refer to the American Rule as a “default rule.” See John J. Donohue, III, The Effects of
Fee Shifting on the Settlement Rate: Theoretical Observations on Costs, Conflicts, and
Contingency Fees, 54 Law & Contemp. Probs. 195, 196, 201 (1991). In a recent study of
2,350 material contracts contained in Form 8-K “current report” filings with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller
found “a substantial tendency to opt out of the American Rule and into some variant
of the English Rule” but that “the American Rule also retains considerable
popularity,” with the result that, in their view, “neither system for compensating
attorneys enjoys an overwhelming efficiency advantage.” Theodore Eisenberg &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The English vs. the American Rule on Attorneys Fees: An Empirical Study
of Attorney Fee Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts 37–38 (N.Y.U. Law Sch. Law
& Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-52, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/paper=1706054.
54
See Herbert M. Kritzer, The English Rule, 78 A.B.A. J. 54, 55 (Nov. 1992).
55
See Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: What Does
the Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1943, 1947–48 (2002).
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grounded legal claims to settle or to avoid litigating them in the
first place, and has a similar effect on litigants who are averse to
risk, regardless of the merits of their cases. . . . It is unclear whether
fee shifting increases the likelihood of settlement, whether it
decreases total expenditures on litigation or total payouts by
defendants, or whether on balance it improves incentives for
primary behavior. It is even unclear whether fee shifting makes it
easier for parties with small meritorious claims to obtain
compensation, in light of the increased costs per case that it
induces.
....
Rules that encourage parties to raise relatively innovative claims and
defenses help to break down precedent, while rules that penalize
risk-taking and novel arguments help to preserve traditional formal
categories. Given the pervasive influence of ostensibly procedural
rules on substantive outcomes, it may not be possible to separate
the policy of fee shifting from deeper questions of what the law
56
should be.

The American Rule is subject to a number of exceptions, both judgemade and statutory. In the former category is the rule that courts carved
out in order to ensure that those who created a common fund could be
57
reimbursed from that fund. With the advent of the modern class action
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, as amended in 1966, the scope
for application of this exception vastly expanded and so did the influence
of the class action on private enforcement.
The Supreme Court put a stop to additional court-created
58
exceptions in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society. Alyeska
quickly elicited legislation prescribing fee shifting for federal civil rights
cases, only some of which had previously been governed by statutory fee59
shifting provisions. Alyeska also may have contributed to the growing
legislative resort to such provisions thereafter (once it was clear that
Congress alone could authorize additional exceptions). Finally, both the
1976 statute responding to Alyeska and its legislative history of
congressional policy choices made it difficult for the judiciary to expand
60
attorney fee shifting by court rule.

56

Avery Weiner Katz & Chris William Sanchirico, Fee Shifting, in Procedural Law
& Economics 271, 272, 302–03 (Chris William Sanchirico, ed. 2012) (8 Encyclopedia
of Law and Economics, 2d ed.).
57
Here the departure consists not in the losing defendant(s) paying the winning
plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees, but rather in shifting some of the responsibility for those
fees from the named class representative(s) to the absent members of the class—all to
come out of, thus reducing, the amount recovered from the defendant(s).
58
421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
59
See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006).
60
Katz and Sanchirico observe that, although the effect of fee shifting on
settlement has been the issue on which the economic literature has focused “more

2013]

PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT

653

3. Funding
Attorneys’ fees are a matter of contract between lawyer and client,
subject to minimal control by courts in order to prevent abuse by lawyers
of their roles as officers of the court and fiduciaries for their clients, and
to greater control in circumstances that prevent a normal principal-agent
relationship, whether as a result of a client’s age, mental condition, or
status as an absent member of a certified class. Indeed, there is some
evidence that nineteenth century efforts to regulate attorneys’ fees
through price ceilings were important in the adoption of the American
61
Rule.
Although publicly-funded legal aid once provided support for some
civil litigation by those without financial means, there is not now a
functioning federal civil legal aid system worthy of the name, and federal
62
legal aid is prohibited for class actions. Non-profit groups played an
important role in private enforcement of statutory and administrative law
in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly in the civil rights and environmental
63
fields, and their success spurred the creation and private funding of
64
groups with radically different legal and political agendas. With the
proliferation of interest groups who seek influence through litigation,
competition for support from private funds has increased as has
competition for talented lawyers willing to make personal financial
sacrifices.
In the absence of public legal aid or a private interest group
champion, the poor and those of modest means who wish to initiate civil
litigation require other forms of assistance in order to gain access to the
market for legal services. Since the turn of the twentieth century, clients
and lawyers have been free to contract for a no-win, no-fee
representation with some specific exceptions (criminal cases and most
divorce matters). Such arrangements are most common in, but not
restricted to, tort litigation and they most commonly call for the lawyer to
65
receive one-third of any monetary judgment. It is also typical of such
arrangements that the lawyer will pay the costs of litigation, subject to full
or partial reimbursement in the event of success.

than any other. . . . at best the effects are ambiguous.” Katz & Sanchirico, supra note
56, at 281–82.
61
See Leubsdorf, supra note 51, at 13.
62
45 C.F.R. § 1617.3 (2012) (“Recipients are prohibited from initiating or
participating in any class action.”); see Hadfield, supra note 39, at 140.
63
See Belton, supra note 12, at 922–23; Thompson, supra note 6, at 185–87.
64
See Ann Southworth, Lawyers of the Right: Professionalizing the
Conservative Coalition 10–13 (2008); Steven M. Teles, The Rise of the
Conservative Legal Movement: The Battle for Control of the Law 60–61
(2008).
65
See Herbert M. Kritzer, Risks, Reputations, and Rewards: Contingency
Fee Legal Practice in the United States 9, 38–39 (2004).
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The opportunity to earn a contingent fee is unlikely to attract lawyers
unless there is a reasonable prospect for a substantial monetary
recovery—with “substantial” being defined with reference to the likely
costs of the litigation, the amount of time the matter will require, and the
66
nature of a particular lawyer’s practice. As the cost of litigation has
increased, two phenomena may have enhanced the importance of
litigation-funding mechanisms that permit clients and their attorneys to
look elsewhere than the clients’ personal assets to fund legal
representation. First, some of what was affordable litigation for fee-paying
clients 40 or 50 years ago may no longer be, at least in federal court, with
the result that those at risk of being denied access to the market for legal
services are not just the poor and those of modest means but a larger
segment of the middle class. Second, and relatedly, the universe of claims
that a rational actor would not bring as an individual because the cost of
prosecuting them would consume too great a percentage of any possible
67
recovery—including so-called “negative value” claims —may have
increased apace.
Focusing on the common fund exception to the American Rule
helps to understand what it is about the modern American class action
that renders it both such a powerful tool of enforcement and such a
strong draw to those whose interest is less in a common benefit than it is
in a common fund. A foundational assumption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is that they are trans-substantive and thus apply to all civil
68
actions in federal court. The 1966 amendments to Rule 23 did not just
create new types of class actions; particularly through the addition of
Rule 23(b)(3) for cases seeking predominantly monetary relief, they
greatly expanded the field in which the common fund exception to the
American Rule could operate. Promulgated by the Supreme Court under
a statute delegating federal legislative power and specifying that valid
rules supersede previously enacted statutes with which they are in
conflict, Rule 23 immediately overlaid pre-1966 private enforcement
regimes and became part of the general landscape in which subsequent
regimes were constructed.

66
Empirical research supports economic theory in debunking the linked
contentions that the United States suffers from a surfeit of frivolous litigation and
that the contingent fee is a cause of the problem. Lawyers who practice on a
contingent fee basis are no more interested in throwing their money away than other
rational maximizers. Many practices dependent on such arrangements—for instance,
practices that stress high volume, modest stakes over low volume, high stakes cases
and individual over representative actions—are characterized by a portfolio of cases
with different probabilities of success, the great majority of which present little risk of
no recovery through judgment or settlement, although there may be substantial
uncertainty regarding the amount that will be recovered or the investment of the
lawyer’s time that will be required. See id. at 11, 13, 17.
67
In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F. 3d 408, 411 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004).
68
See Burbank, supra note 18, at 109–10.
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When considering class actions under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3), and on the assumption that no fee-shifting statute
applies, one should distinguish among: (1) truly large claims where
individual representation on a fee-paying or contingency-fee basis would
be perfectly plausible; (2) claims where the recovery, viewed in isolation,
might very well be substantial but the costs of litigation would be such a
large percentage of that recovery as to prevent individual representation
on a fee-paying or contingency-fee basis, including negative-value claims;
and (3) truly small claims, where the recovery would be a small fraction
of the costs of litigation and as a result no one but a wealthy person on a
mission would think of bringing them individually because no lawyer
would handle such cases on anything but a fee-paying basis (unless the
lawyer were on a mission related to some larger political or legal
agenda).
The predominant rationale for representative treatment in the first
category relates to litigation efficiency and consistency. That rationale is
not available for the second and third categories, since by definition the
availability of the class action permits litigation that would not otherwise
take place (unless it could be maintained through some form of nonclass aggregation). Rather, in the second category, class treatment might
be justified for the purpose of compensation, or for the dual purposes of
compensation and deterrence, with aggregate treatment lowering the
unit cost of litigation sufficiently to make the effort worthwhile. In the
third category, however, compensation joins litigation efficiency and
consistency on the fiction shelf, and only deterrence would seem to
69
justify priming the heavy artillery of a class suit.
From the perspective of private enforcement, and in the context of
American political and legal institutions, the use of class actions for “truly
small claims” is troublesome only to the extent that it advances an
enforcement goal that is not part of the applicable regulatory policy or
that, either alone or in combination with other modes of enforcement, it
results in a level of enforcement that is substantially different from that
contemplated by those responsible for regulatory policy. In the case of
federal class actions, the primary sources of potential disconnect from
federal or state regulatory policy result from the fact that the Supreme
Court has very narrowly interpreted the prohibition against supervisory
70
court rules that “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,” and
71
that the Federal Rules apply trans-substantively.

69

See Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs
Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepeneurial Lawyers, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 103, 107 (2006).
70
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
71
Readers may have noticed our failure to discuss either insurance for legal
expenses or alternative litigation funding (ALF), so called because the contingent fee
and liability insurance covering defense costs are themselves mechanisms of thirdparty funding. See Steven Garber, Alternative Litigation Financing in the United States:
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B. Procedure
The 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provided a system that
could attract a great deal of private litigation, including litigation enforcing
statutory and administrative law. In the years following 1938, a number of
72
Supreme Court decisions, including Hickman v. Taylor and Conley v.
73
Gibson, embraced the concepts of notice pleading and broad discovery.
Eventually, however, notice pleading, broad discovery (unleashed further
by amendments to the Federal Rules in 1970), and a restrictive view of
summary judgment assumed a different complexion in light of statutory
incentives to litigate (e.g., a host of new federal statutes with pro-plaintiff
fee-shifting provisions), the modern class action, and a bar responsive to
such incentives and assisted by decisions striking down anti-competitive
74
regulations like the traditional ban on advertising.
As the volume of federal litigation increased, and as the federal
75
judiciary became more conservative, the rulemakers responded by
turning to one approach after another—from managerial judging, to
76
sanctions, to summary judgment. Although different in many respects,
these approaches share the quest for greater definition of claims and
defenses and the ability it affords courts to make rational judgments as to

Issues, Knowns, and Unknowns 1 (RAND, Occasional Paper, 2010), available at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_
OP306.pdf; see also Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim is this Anyway? Third-Party Litigation
Funding, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1268, 1275–76 (2011). From the perspective of access to
court for private enforcement, insurance is not an important consideration for
plaintiffs because of the combination of contingency fees and the American Rule;
liability insurance that covers both indemnity and legal expenses is obviously
important for defendants. Moreover, it is our impression that the incidence and
coverage of pre-paid legal service plans is not consequential for these purposes. The
same is true (at least for the present) of ALF. ALF has only recently made an
appearance on the U.S. legal scene; it confronts significant barriers erected by the
self-regulating legal profession. See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the
Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 953, 979–82 (2000);
Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 Vand. L. Rev. 61 (2011). In addition, to
the extent that ALF is focused on investing in cases with the potential for substantial
recoveries, it seeks entry into a market in which both the contingency fee and class
actions are well-established. That may help to explain why a recent study found three
segments of ALF business, two of which involved loans, one to (usually) personalinjury plaintiffs and one to plaintiffs’ law firms, and one of which involved investment
in commercial (inter-corporate) lawsuits. In their loan activities, ALF providers can
be viewed as substituting for banks in a time of tight credit, charging (high) interest
rather than taking a percentage of any recovery. See Garber, supra.
72
329 U.S. 495 (1947).
73
355 U.S. 41 (1957).
74
See Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil
Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 591, 620
(2004).
75
See id. at 625.
76
Id. at 624.
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whether a case should be permitted to proceed. As discussed above,
however, they make more difficult efforts to determine whether existing
resources were inadequate to accommodate increasing caseloads.
Assessing the cost of modern federal litigation as a basis for procedural
reform is no easier, at least when the supposed cause of disproportionate
cost is discovery.
Increasingly over the last 30 years, probably the greatest source of
complaint voiced by critics of litigation has been the cost of federal civil
litigation, with the primary culprit said to be the cost of discovery,
particularly document discovery (most is born by the party from whom
discovery is sought and cannot be shifted ex post from the winner to the
loser). At the same time, however, thoughtful scholars and judges have
78
pointed out the potential costs of cutting back on discovery.
The rulemakers have responded to complaints about discovery with
round after round of amendments designed to streamline the discovery
79
process. Most recently, they fashioned amendments to address a
phenomenon that even skeptical empiricists understand may have
changed the landscape and the conclusions about costs and benefits that
one should draw from it: discovery of electronic documents, or e-discovery.
Yet, we do not know what the impact of e-discovery has been, because
anecdotes about discovery continue to dominate methodologically sound

77
See id.; Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The
Example of Rule 11, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1925, 1930–31 (1989).
78
“We should keep clearly in mind that discovery is the American alternative to
the administrative state. . . . Every day, hundreds of American lawyers caution their
clients that an unlawful course of conduct will be accompanied by serious risk of
exposure at the hands of some hundreds of thousands of lawyers, each armed with a
subpoena power by which misdeeds can be uncovered. Unless corresponding new
powers are conferred on public officers, constricting discovery would diminish the
disincentives for lawless behavior across a wide spectrum of forbidden conduct.” Paul
D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 Ala. L. Rev. 51, 54 (1997). Judge Patrick
Higginbotham, former Chair of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, also
emphasized the relationship of discovery to the ability to enforce congressional
statutes: “Congress has elected to use the private suit, private attorneys-general as an
enforcing mechanism for the anti-trust laws, the securities laws, environmental laws,
civil rights and more. In the main, the plaintiff in these suits must discover his
evidence from the defendant. Calibration of discovery is calibration of the level of
enforcement of the social policy set by Congress.” Patrick Higginbotham, Foreword, 49
Ala. L. Rev. 1, 4–5 (1997).
79
They introduced (but then restricted the ambit of) required disclosures (i.e.,
without waiting for a discovery demand), see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (as amended in
1993 and 2000), presumptive limits on the number of interrogatories, see Fed. R. Civ.
P. 33(a) (as amended in 1993), and depositions, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2) (as
amended in 1993) and the length of depositions, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2) (as
amended in 2000), and even purported to reduce the universe of discoverable
material (in the absence of a court order) from that which is relevant to the subject
matter of the action to that which is relevant to a claim or defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1) (as amended in 2000).
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research—a phenomenon characteristic of discourse about all of American
80
civil litigation.
When evaluating criticisms of American litigation, it is important to
understand that, as Robert Gordon recently put it, “[c]areful studies
demonstrate that the ‘litigation explosion’ and ‘liability crisis’ are largely
myths and that most lawyers’ efforts go into representing businesses, not
individuals; unfortunately, those studies have had no restraining effect on
81
this epidemic of lawyers’ open expression of disdain for law.” With
respect to discovery in particular, empirical research conducted over 40
years has not demonstrated that it is a problem—disproportionately
82
expensive—in more than a small slice of litigation. Instead, study after
study has found that discovery is a problem in precisely the types of cases
83
that one would expect—high stakes, complex cases. An October 2009
Federal Judicial Center survey of attorneys in recently closed federal civil
cases again failed to support the story of ubiquitous abuse or skyrocketing
84
cost.
Notwithstanding the failure of empirical study to verify the oft-told
tale of pervasive discovery abuse and pervasively crushing discovery
expense, the Supreme Court invoked both, together with the supposed
inability of federal judges to manage discovery, as reasons to change
federal procedural law—but not the aspects of that law that govern
discovery. Rather, in order that defendants in massive antitrust class
85
actions might be spared putatively impositional discovery, the Supreme
Court made it more difficult for the plaintiffs in such cases to survive a
motion to dismiss. They did so chiefly by resuscitating the distinctions
between “facts” and “conclusions” that the drafters of the Federal Rules
had rejected and by transforming the motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted from a vehicle for testing
the plaintiff’s legal theory into a means to weed out complaints that,
shorn of conclusions, do not set forth sufficient facts to make the
86
plaintiff’s claim plausible. Thereafter, in another case where the Court
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See, e.g., id. at 1437.
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See Lee & Willging, supra note 80, at 40 (finding that median estimates of
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litigation costs).
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See Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 635, 646 (1989).
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See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007); Burbank, supra
note 18, at 113.
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was concerned about the costs of discovery—but there, the costs of
diverting the time and attention of high government officials—the Court
made clear what should have been obvious, namely that the new pleading
87
regime applies to all federal civil cases.
Notice pleading and broad discovery were created under the
auspices of the Supreme Court acting pursuant to congressional
delegation. Once firmly entrenched, they became part of the
background against which Congress legislated, part of the foundation of
congressional private enforcement regimes. They also became part of the
status quo and thus were highly resistant to change through the
88
lawmaking process that brought them forth—the Enabling Act process.
From this perspective, desiring to effect change, the Court was equally
hobbled by the inertial power of the status quo and the limitations
created by foundational assumptions and operating principles associated
with the Enabling Act process. The Court effectively amended the
Federal Rules on pleading through judicial decision because the Justices
knew that, even if amendments through the prescribed process could
survive congressional review, they would embroil the process and the
Court in political controversy.
It is no surprise that the anecdotes one hears from the defenders of
the Court’s recent pleading decisions have to do only with the costs of
litigation, not its benefits, or that there is no mention of the money that
would be required to replace private litigation as a means of securing
compensation and enforcing important social norms. Imagine the
reaction of the Chamber of Commerce if the proposal were to give the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission adequate resources, raised
through increased taxes, to enforce federal anti-discrimination law.
C. The Lawmaking Powers of the Judiciary
There are four aspects of federal judicial power that appear to us
particularly salient from the perspective of private enforcement of
statutory and administrative law. First, unlike state courts, federal courts
have very limited power to make substantive law. Second, like most state
judiciaries, the federal judiciary has very substantial power to make
procedural law, both in the context of deciding cases and prospectively
through court rules. Third, the federal courts have some ability to
regulate access to court through interpretations of the constitutional
requirements (in Article III) that have been used to limit who has
standing to sue. Fourth, having the power to interpret federal statutes,
the federal courts can use that power either to infer or to refuse to infer
private rights of action. We take up each of these points briefly below.
87

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009); Burbank, supra note 18, at
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88
Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
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Federal courts do not have common lawmaking powers remotely
approximating those of state courts. As a result, when, for instance,
existing tort law is thought to provide inadequate protection, and it is
also thought that federal law is needed to solve the unremedied systemic
problem, the law in question will almost always be federal statutory or
89
administrative law. Interstate pollution was once one of the rare
exceptions to this proposition, but after Congress acted, the federal
courts receded (as lawmaker), noting that “when Congress addresses a
question previously governed by a decision rested on federal common
law the need for such an unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal courts
90
disappears.”
Subject to the Constitution, Congress holds ultimate lawmaking
91
power concerning procedure in the federal courts. As discussed above,
however, since 1934 the Supreme Court has had the power to
promulgate procedural law for all civil actions through court rules that
92
are subject to congressional review before they become effective; the
rules so promulgated are general (trans-substantive), and the Court has
read statutory limitations on its rulemaking power very narrowly. The
federal courts also have the power to fashion procedural law in their
decisions so long as such procedural common law is consistent with
federal statutes and Federal Rules. With respect to rulemaking, the result
has been that Federal Rules, notably Rule 23, can take on a life of their
own—act as a wild card—for purposes of private enforcement, divorced
from the statutes and administrative regulations that are the authorized
93
sources of regulatory policy. With respect to procedural common law,
the Court’s recent pleading decisions suggest how the judiciary may be
able to sap private enforcement regimes through change to the
background rules under the guise of interpretation, evading

89

See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317–19 (1981).
Id. at 314; see Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011)
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congressional review before the judiciary’s policy choices become
94
effective.
Congress has very substantial power to recruit private citizens to
enforce statutory and administrative law, but that power is limited by
Article III of the United States Constitution. Having liberally construed
Article III standing requirements during the 1960s and into the 1970s, a
more conservative Supreme Court pulled back, thereby reducing the
95
universe of eligible enforcers. Similarly, having liberally interpreted
federal statutes and administrative regulations to imply private rights of
action for a number of years, the Court changed course and made private
enforcement more difficult in the absence of clear evidence of
96
congressional intent.
IV. Choosing an Enforcement Regime
In this Part we consider the choice of private enforcement from the
standpoint of a legislature sincerely seeking to secure enforcement of its
regulatory commands. In the domain of command and control
regulation, the choice of private enforcement must be understood in
relation to potential sources of public enforcement, either in the form of
public prosecutions in court or through some administrative process.
Public and private enforcement can be treated as substitutes for one
another, or can be used in a complementary fashion. Although public
and private enforcement are sometimes used independently of one
another, they are also commonly used in combination, with some powers
being delegated to administrative actors, while others are left to private
litigants and courts within the same statute. In hybrid regimes, either
public or private enforcement can be given the dominant role, with the
other playing a more ancillary one. The two forms can be given
important and distinctly separate roles in a regulatory scheme, such as by
authorizing administrators to promulgate rules and allowing private
parties to enforce them; or they can be given substantially overlapping
roles, such as in an election of remedies arrangement where claimants
can either proceed in court or submit their claim to an administrative
tribunal. The range of possible combinations of public and private
enforcement, and of administrative and legal process, is substantial and
complex, and we do not attempt a comprehensive mapping here.
The choice between public and private enforcement does not
correspond in any straightforward way to the choice between strong and
weak enforcement. Public, private, and hybrid regimes can each range
from weak to strong. A private enforcement regime with limited
opportunities and incentives can produce far weaker enforcement than
94

See Burbank, supra note 18.
See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 4, at 936; Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public
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an agency with strong formal powers, ample resources, and leadership
dedicated to vigorous enforcement. Conversely, a robust private
enforcement regime can produce stronger enforcement than an agency
with modest powers, insufficient resources, or a leadership disinclined
toward vigorous implementation. We will discuss differences between
97
weak and strong private enforcement regimes later in this part.
A. The Potential Advantages of Private Enforcement
In assessing the potential advantages and disadvantages of private
enforcement regimes, we draw on the substantial literature debating
their wisdom, which is always, explicitly or implicitly, evaluating them in
relation to public enforcement. This literature is largely characterized by
advocacy either for or against private enforcement. Aside from advocacy,
we believe that the arguments on each side highlight dimensions of
private enforcement that are useful to weigh when considering whether
to deploy this enforcement strategy. As discussed in Part I, we also believe
that many of the arguments are context-dependent, with their relative
importance likely to vary across specific policy domains and political,
legal, and institutional environments.
On the positive side of the ledger, relative to administrative
implementation, private enforcement regimes can: (1) multiply
resources devoted to prosecuting enforcement actions; (2) shift the costs
of regulation off of governmental budgets and onto the private sector;
(3) take advantage of private information to detect violations; (4)
encourage legal and policy innovation; (5) emit a clear and consistent
signal that violations will be prosecuted, providing insurance against the
risk that a system of administrative implementation will be subverted; (6)
limit the need for direct and visible intervention by the bureaucracy in
the economy and society; and (7) facilitate participatory and democratic
98
governance.
Private enforcement regimes multiply prosecutorial resources.
Regulation scholars have often observed that budgetary limitations are a
core and recurring constraint on the administrative state’s enforcement
99
capacity. Allowing and encouraging private litigation can bring vastly
more resources to bear on enforcement, potentially mobilizing private

97

See infra Part IV.A–C.
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Stephenson, supra note 10.
99
See Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private
Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1384, 1410 (2000);
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Assistant Attorney General H. Graham Morrison argued that, in the absence of
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Article III, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 163, 221 (1992).
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litigants and plaintiffs’ attorneys in numbers that dwarf agency capacity.
Moreover, private enforcement litigation can actually enhance the
efficient use of scarce bureaucratic resources by allowing administrators
to focus enforcement efforts on violations that do not provide adequate
incentives for private enforcement, while resting assured that those that
101
do will be prosecuted by private litigants.
Scarcity of government revenue also highlights the comparative
political feasibility of enacting private enforcement regimes as compared
to bureaucratic state-building. A number of scholars have argued that
lack of adequate tax revenue, or the political costs of raising it,
encourages Congress to achieve public policy goals through private legal
process because it shifts the costs of regulation away from the state and
102
on to private parties. Scarcity of public funds places obvious limits on
administrative implementation. As distinguished from funding an
executive agency to carry out enforcement activities, private enforcement
regimes are, from Congress’s standpoint, more or less self-funding.
Although increasing rates of litigation will cause some increase in the
costs of maintaining the federal judiciary, these costs are not easily
traceable by voters to legislators’ support for a piece of regulatory
legislation with a private enforcement regime. Thus, with private
enforcement regimes, legislators can provide for policy implementation
at lesser cost than with administrative implementation, and can minimize
103
blame for what costs are born by the government.
Private enforcement regimes have comparative informational
advantages for detecting violations. Potential litigant-enforcers—who are
directly affected by violations, whose proximity to violations gives them
inside information, and whose connections to the relevant industry may
give them expertise to judge violations—collectively have knowledge
about violations that far exceeds what the administrative state could
100

See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 Md. L. Rev. 215, 218 (1983); Gilles, supra
note 99, at 1387; Kent Roach & Michael J. Trebilcock, Private Enforcement of Competition
Laws, 34 Osgoode Hall L.J. 461, 479–81 (1996); Richard B. Stewart & Cass R.
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101
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note 6, at 200.
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See Farhang, supra note 2, at 129–71; Kagan, supra note 21, at 15–16; R. Shep
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Governing Awards of Attorneys’ Fees, 38 W. Pol. Q. 238 (1985).
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An insincere legislature that wished for political reasons to appear to be
serious about enforcement might regard the ability to constrain court capacity
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comparable underfunding of a public enforcement regime.
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achieve through monitoring, even under the most optimistic budget
104
As one scholar put it, “the massive governmental
scenarios.
expenditures required to detect and investigate misconduct are no match
for the millions of ‘eyes on the ground’ that bear witness
105
to . . . violations.”
Private enforcement regimes encourage legal innovation. Private
litigants stand in sharp contrast with a centralized and hierarchical
bureaucracy, which frequently engenders what Richard Stewart and Cass
Sunstein characterize as comparative “diseconomies of scale, given
multiple layers of decision and review and the temptation to adopt overly
106
rigid norms in order to reduce administrative costs.” As compared with
conservative tendencies that bureaucracy fosters, private litigants and
attorneys are more likely to press for innovations in legal theories and
strategies that could expand the parameters of liability and the methods
107
for establishing it, innovations that may be adopted by public enforcers.
Freedom from bureaucratic constraint also allows private litigants to
mobilize and reallocate their enforcement resources more flexibly and
108
expeditiously than bureaucrats.
The decentralized nature of private enforcement litigation, as
contrasted with centralized bureaucracy, can also encourage policy
innovation for reasons similar to those associated with federalist
109
governing arrangements. As distinguished from the imposition of a
policy solution at the top of a centralized and hierarchical bureaucracy,
litigation of an issue among many parties and interests, and across many
judicial jurisdictions, can lead to experimentation with a multiplicity of
policy responses to a problem, and successful policy solutions will gain
110
traction and spread.
Private enforcement regimes with adequate incentives for
enforcement will produce durable and consistent enforcement pressure,
avoiding influences that may lead an agency to stray from legislators’
enforcement preferences. In contrast, regulators may choose to underenforce for a number of reasons. Given that intense preferences for
under-enforcement exist in the regulated population, while preferences
104
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for enforcement are far more diffuse, the regulated population has
incentives and opportunities to use lobbying, campaign contributions,
and other means to seek to influence or capture an agency so as to
111
discourage enforcement. Regulators themselves may have preferences
for under-enforcement for many reasons, including ideological
preferences, career goals, to protect or enhance budget allocations, to
112
avoid political controversy, or simple laziness. Finally, administrators
may face pressure to under-enforce from executives or legislatures who
may be motivated by ideological preferences, electoral imperatives in
113
general, or the desire to protect specific constituents in particular.
Although this literature has focused on private enforcement regimes
created because of concern about under-enforcement by administrators,
legislators may believe that private enforcement regimes likewise can
114
guard against over-enforcement by the bureaucracy.
Private enforcement can counterbalance uncertainty about agency
enforcement in two ways. Most obviously and importantly, it can operate
as a simple substitute for or adjunct to public enforcement. Further, it
can bring attention to violations going unaddressed by public agencies
charged with enforcement responsibilities and thereby shame or prod
115
Given the tendency of the sources of underthem into action.
enforcement identified above to vacillate over time, private litigation
performs what one regulation scholar called a “failsafe function,” by
“ensuring that legal norms are not wholly dependent on the current
attitudes of public enforcers . . . and that the legal system emits clear and
116
consistent signals to those who might be tempted to offend.”
Private enforcement regimes may provide a compromise alternative
to bureaucratic state-building in political environments in which anti117
bureaucracy sentiments are salient and influential. Private litigation,

111
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with its air of private dispute resolution, is less visible and more
ambiguous as a form of state intervention. Therefore, it may be preferred
to bureaucratic state-building by legislators with antistatist preferences, a
significant strand of the American political tradition, particularly as
applied to the central state in the United States’ federalist system.
Indeed, private enforcement regimes may be embraced by such
118
legislators as a way of thwarting the growth of bureaucracy. Legislators
and the public tend to regard private enforcement regimes, as Kagan
119
As
puts it, as “nonstatist mechanisms” of policy implementation.
compared to constructing and financing bureaucratic regulatory
enforcement machinery and endowing it with coercive powers, for
example, to investigate, prosecute, adjudicate, and issue cease-and-desist
orders, an enforcement regime that is founded instead on allowing
aggrieved persons to prosecute their own complaints in court may be
likely to attract broader support. If there are pivotal lawmakers prepared
to obstruct enactment of regulatory policy that entails bureaucratic statebuilding, utilizing private enforcement regimes may facilitate overcoming
such obstructions.
Finally, private enforcement regimes contribute to participatory and
120
democratic self-government. Meaningful access to opportunities to
defend and advance rights through litigation can amount to a form of
active and direct citizen participation in the enterprise of selfgovernment, constituting a valuable and important facet of democratic
life. This form of participation may incorporate interests into the
governing process that would be rendered impotent by simple
majoritarianism. Although majoritarian institutions are often thought
emblematic of democracy, such institutions do not exhaust forms of
democratic governance. As Feeley and Rubin put it, “perhaps a
democracy must respect the rights of individuals or be governed by
organic law or provide opportunities for expression and participation or
establish conditions for rational discourse,” and courts may be
distinctively suited to contributing these elements to a broader
121
democratic regime.
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B. The Potential Disadvantages of Private Enforcement
The foregoing account of private enforcement regimes as an
effective form of policy intervention is heatedly contested. A contending
line of arguments not only doubts whether private litigation can advance
statutory policy goals, but, in its strongest form, suspects that private
litigation may actually discourage compliance efforts. This perspective is
characterized by the following core arguments: private enforcement
regimes (1) empower judges, who lack policy expertise, to make policy;
(2) tend to produce inconsistent and contradictory doctrine from courts;
(3) weaken the administrative state’s capacity to articulate a coherent
regulatory scheme by preempting administrative rulemaking; (4) usurp
prosecutorial discretion; (5) discourage cooperation with regulators and
voluntary compliance; (6) weaken oversight of policy implementation by
the legislative and executive branches; and (7) lack democratic
legitimacy and accountability.
A primary justification for delegation of policy implementation
authority to bureaucracy is to leverage the expertise—informational
resources, analytical competence, etc.—of policymakers within an
122
administrative body. Critics of private enforcement emphasize that
most judges are generalists by training, lacking the specialized training
123
necessary to deal with complex policy problems. In the course of
judging they deal with a multitude of policy areas one after another,
developing a depth of knowledge in none. This makes judges, on
balance, far less informed and expert than administrators at
124
policymaking.
Private enforcement regimes produce fragmented and incoherent
policy. As compared to a more centralized, unified, and integrated
administrative scheme, orchestrated by an administrator at the top of a
hierarchical agency with powers of national scope, when a large role is
given to private litigation in implementation, resulting policy will tend to
be confused, inconsistent, and even straightforwardly contradictory. This
is so for reasons having to do with the party-driven nature of litigation
and the decentralized structure of the judiciary. When courts make
122
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W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 861–62 (2001);
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policy in response to private litigation, judges are only able to rule on
issues presented to them by private litigants. These private litigants select
and frame issues, thus setting the judicial policy agenda, in the course of
pursuing highly particularized interests. These interests, and the
associated policy positions being advocated, inevitably will be divergent
across private plaintiffs and private attorneys, and they may not
correspond with, and in fact may be in competition with, the public
125
In response to issues presented in this fashion to a
interest.
decentralized court system, non-expert judges make piecemeal policy,
one case at a time, often without adequate consideration or
understanding of the larger regulatory scheme. Given the inevitable
heterogeneity of policy preferences among judges, the multitude of
judges authoring regulatory policy often work at cross-purposes, seeking
to advance conflicting and even contradictory regulatory agendas. This
renders regulatory policy, according to critic Richard Pierce, via “judicial
126
opinions [that] are massively inconsistent and incoherent.”
Private enforcement regimes weaken bureaucratic lawmaking in
hybrid regimes that, in addition to providing for private enforcement,
also empower administrators to articulate substantive law or to prosecute
enforcement actions. Inevitably, private litigation will force courts to
delineate the meaning of broadly worded regulatory statutes on
important issues before administrators have the opportunity to address
them, narrowing the scope of administrators’ opportunity to do so
127
Private enforcement also diminishes the
through rulemaking.
effectiveness of the traditional administrative strategy of regulating
complex and uncertain policy areas by promulgating broad rules, which
may in some instances be infeasible to comply with, and relying on
128
prosecutorial discretion to temper the effects of the rule. With wide
opportunities for private enforcement litigation, prosecutorial discretion
ceases to operate as a safety valve and this regulatory strategy is
129
undermined. Private enforcement further subverts an administrator’s
ability to mount litigation campaigns strategically calculated to advance
certain policy goals, such as by selecting cases best suited to facilitate a
desired change in the law, forum shopping, and tactically ordering
presentation of issues to appellate courts so as to gradually build
125
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precedent toward a desired outcome. With individual private lawyers
representing the interests of individual private clients, an administrator’s
capacity to orchestrate such strategic litigation campaigns is severely
curtailed. To the extent that private litigants make precedent at crosspurposes with an administrator’s goals, it will frequently be binding on
her. Thus, while courts are producing inconsistent and contradictory
regulatory policy, the administrative state’s capacity to send its own clear
and audible signals about what the law requires is simultaneously
130
weakened.
Private enforcement regimes subvert cooperation and voluntary
compliance. Given how adversarial the litigation process is, wide scope for
private enforcement litigation will erode and disrupt efforts at cooperation,
coordination, and negotiation between regulators and those they regulate.
Regulation scholars who voice this concern urge that a significant measure
of voluntary compliance is vital to obtaining enforcement objectives, given
the limited resources available to administrators and courts to coerce
131
compliance. If cooperatively negotiated informal bargains with regulators,
aimed at enhancing compliance, will not protect organizations from private
suits on the same issues, then the prospect of facing private suits will make
132
voluntary agreements far harder to achieve. The contentiousness of
implementation through private litigation is further exacerbated by the fact
that—as compared to administrative enforcement—private litigants will be
more likely to file non-meritorious suits that are brought for strategic or
extortionate purposes against innocent defendants in the hope that they
133
will find it cheaper to settle than to litigate. This further erodes a
cooperative environment conducive to fostering trust and voluntary
compliance.
The legislative and executive branches have less continuing control
over policy when private enforcement is relied on for implementation, as
contrasted with administrative implementation. After a statute is enacted,
private enforcement activity and associated judicial interpretation of
statutes are far harder for legislatures and executives to control and
influence than post-enactment implementation by bureaucrats. Most
significant among forms of continuing legislative control over
bureaucracy, even if future legislatures lack the political capacity or will
to pass a new law, they can exercise some leverage over agency
130

See Bucy, supra note 104, at 66–67; Cross, supra note 115, at 69.
See, e.g., Austin, supra note 127, at 223; Cross, supra note 115, at 67; John T.
Scholz, Voluntary Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement, 6 J.Law & Pol’y 385, 394
(1984).
132
See Robert F. Blomquist, Rethinking the Citizen as Prosecutor Model of
Environmental Enforcement Under the Clean Water Act: Some Overlooked Problems of OutcomeIndependent Values, 22 Ga. L. Rev. 337, 409 (1988); Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 100,
at 1292–93; Zinn, supra note 115, at 84.
133
See Grundfest, supra note 125, at 970–71; Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism:
Tamed or Still Wild?, 2 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 217, 227 (1999); Stephenson,
supra note 10, at 116.
131
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implementation of statutes through such tools as investigation, oversight
hearings, earmarking funds, formal reporting requirements, refusing to
confirm appointees, and, of course, by threatening to reduce or actually
134
reducing an agency’s budget. Executives also possess considerable
capacity to influence agency behavior, particularly through appointment
135
In contrast, if an enacting
(and removal) of agency leadership.
legislature delegates to private enforcers and institutionally independent
courts, there is little if anything that the legislature or the executive can
do to exert supervisory oversight powers, other than passing a new law.
Passing a new law is far more difficult to accomplish, and even when
feasible, has much higher opportunity costs, than traditional tools of
136
bureaucratic oversight. Greater capacity for continuing control of
bureaucracy by the elected branches has led some to regard agencies as a
far more democratically legitimate, accountable, and responsive
137
delegatee than private litigants and courts.
Critics of private enforcement litigation complain that it can be
deeply undemocratic, unsuited to a political community committed to
representative democracy, electoral accountability, and legislative
138
supremacy. Private enforcement regimes give plaintiffs, their lawyers,
and judges excessive power, fostering “judicial imperialism” by “activist”
judges who interpret statutes, in response to the claims of greedy
plaintiffs and their irresponsible lawyers, in ways that would never
succeed in a politically accountable institution. Plaintiffs, their lawyers,

134
See Joel D. Aberbach, Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of
Congressional Oversight 130 (1990); William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al., Cases and
Materials On Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy 1129–
73 (3d ed. 2001); Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of
Rulemaking, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1243, 1295–96 (1999).
135
See Terry M. Moe, Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 Am.
J. Pol. Sci. 197, 197 (1982); Terry M. Moe & Michael Caldwell, The Institutional
Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary
Systems, 150 J. Inst’l & Theoret. Econ. 171, 176 (1994).
136
See Charles R. Shipan, Designing Judicial Review: Interest Groups,
Congress, and Communications Policy 10 (1997); Cross, supra note 134, at 1303–
05; Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative
Arrangements and Political Control of Agencies, 75 Va. L. Rev. 431, 444–45 (1989);
Charles R. Shipan, Interest Groups, Judicial Review, and the Origins of Broadcast Regulation,
49 Admin. L. Rev. 549, 555–56 (1997).
137
See Cross, supra note 134, at 1290–1306; McCubbins et al., supra note 136 at
444–45; Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L.J. 969,
978–79, 999, 1002 (1992); Pierce, supra note 124, at 1251; Laurence H. Silberman,
Chevron—The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 821, 823 (1990).
138
See Patrick M. Garry, A Nation of Adversaries: How the Litigation
Explosion Is Reshaping America 6–8 (1997); Walter K. Olson, The Litigation
Explosion: What Happened When America Unleashed The Lawsuit 300–01
(1991); Jeremy Rabkin, Judicial Compulsions: How Public Law Distorts Public
Policy 247–49 (1989); Ross Sandler & David Schoenbrod, Democracy by
Decree: What Happens When Courts Run Government 6–9 (2003); Nathan
Glazer, Towards an Imperial Judiciary?, 41 Pub. Int. 104, 105, 119–20 (1975).
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and judges are not electorally accountable, and they will stray from the
139
democratic will precisely because they cannot be disciplined by it.
In concluding this discussion of the potential disadvantages of
private enforcement, we stress that critics of private enforcement regard
private litigation as importantly different from litigation prosecuted by
the administrative state. While administrators do not have personal
economic stakes in litigation and can pursue public goals, privately
prosecuted litigation is guided by private (often economic) interests that
may be in conflict with the public interest. While administrators can use
litigation to pursue a desired regulatory regime, private litigation is
fragmented and uncoordinated. Private litigants will bring strategic and
extortionate suits that public administrators would never bring. To the
extent that administrators’ use of litigation departs from these
expectations, it can be disciplined and reined in by the democratic
process, whereas private litigation, by comparison, is largely unfettered. A
lawsuit is not a lawsuit. It matters who is prosecuting it. When it comes to
lawsuits, public and private prosecution should not be confused or
conflated.
C. Structuring a Private Enforcement Regime
If legislators elect to rely on private enforcement litigation for
statutory implementation, they face a host of additional choices of
statutory design concerning such matters as who will have access to the
role of private enforcer, rules of claim aggregation, who will bear
litigation costs and attorneys’ fees, and what remedies will be available.
The cumulative effects of such choices can have profound consequences
for how much or how little private enforcement is actually mobilized. In
discussing these rules below we view them from the standpoint of a
legislature making choices about the nature and extent of private
enforcement desired, highlighting the economic calculus involved in
litigation. We by no means intend to deny or diminish non-economic
140
influences on the choice to litigate by potential plaintiffs and attorneys.
However, from the perspective of statutory design, we believe that the
economic value of claims is an element influencing the choice to litigate
that, unlike other factors, can be readily and substantially influenced by
statutory drafters.

139

Of course, many state judges are elected in the U.S., but the democratic
critique of private enforcement regimes, as far as we are aware, does not take up this
wrinkle.
140
For example, scholars have suggested that the choice to sue may also be
influenced by utility derived from telling one’s side of the story in a conflict, utility
derived from litigation as a form of political participation, or disutility resulting from
feelings of embarrassment or victimization. See Kristin Bumiller, The Civil Rights
Society: The Social Construction Of Victims 98–103 (1988); Lawrence, supra
note 120, at 467; Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged
Sword of Procedural Fairness, 1 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 171, 172–73 (2005).
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The economic motive to litigate is, moreover, a distinctively
important one in the sense of being a threshold condition in the majority
of cases. This is because, whatever other motives may also be at play, very
few plaintiffs will be willing or able to proceed with litigation under an
141
expectation of suffering financial loss. This is not to claim that plaintiffs
are motivated by greed, but rather that an expectation of a positive,
rather than a negative, economic outcome will typically be a
precondition to the choice to sue, even if there are other political or
psychological reasons for proceeding. As one scholar studying litigation
from a social psychological perspective put it in reference to the effect of
monetary damages on the choice to litigate, “even a boundedly rational
psychological model will assume that expectations play a central role in
142
choice.” Further, the decision to sue will not be made by the plaintiff
alone, but will typically also require the agreement of a lawyer. In legal
systems in which plaintiffs’ lawyers are regularly dependent on proceeds
from the successful prosecution of a case for some or all of their
compensation, unless a plaintiff is willing and able to carry the large
burden of litigation costs on her own, before filing suit her attorney will
have to assess whether investment of limited resources in a case is
143
warranted based on an evaluation of its risks and potential returns.
1. Structuring Formal Access Rules
The initial choice that legislators face is whether to allow private
enforcement at all. Given the creation of a substantive legal rule—for
example, prohibitions against job discrimination, or against deceptive
consumer practices—the legislature must decide whether private lawsuits
should be permitted, and if so, who should be permitted to seek
144
remedies via private lawsuits. In considering the latter question, the
legislature must decide whether the universe of private enforcers should
be limited to persons injured by violations of statutory provisions or
administrative regulations, and if so, whether and how to define the
nature of the injury that will suffice to entitle a person to serve as a
private enforcer. We noted in Part III that Article III of the U.S.
Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, sets limits on the
141
See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Justice Broker: Lawyers and Ordinary
Litigation 28–34 (1990). But see Sally Engle Merry & Susan S. Silbey, What Do
Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the Concept of Dispute, 9 Just. Sys. J. 151, 172 (1984).
142
Robert J. MacCoun, Media Reporting of Jury Verdicts: Is the Tail (of the Distribution)
Wagging the Dog?, 55 DePaul L. Rev. 539, 539 (2006).
143
See Kritzer, supra note 65, at 11; Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice:
Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1393, 1426 (1992); Earl
Johnson, Jr., Lawyers’ Choice: A Theoretical Appraisal of Litigation Investment Decisions, 15
Law & Soc’y Rev. 567, 567–68 (1981); Herbert M. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths
Concerning Contingency Fees, 80 Wash. U. L.Q. 739, 748–49 (2002).
144
As we discuss in Part III, although the Supreme Court once quite liberally
found implied rights of action in federal statutes, since the late 1970s it has refused to
do so absent a sufficiently clear indication of legislative intent to confer rights of
private enforcement.
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power of Congress to confer standing. We have also noted, however, that
although those limits have been interpreted more strictly in recent
decades, they still leave substantial room for private enforcement,
perhaps best illustrated by the so-called citizen-suit provisions of federal
145
environmental statutes. As we discuss in Part V with respect to job
discrimination, the U.S. Congress elected to make private enforcement
central, allowing suits by any “person claiming to be aggrieved.” With
respect to most types of deceptive consumer practices, in contrast, it
elected not to allow private lawsuits at all, instead vesting all enforcement
authority with an administrative agency (with states free to establish their
own enforcement regimes, most of which do authorize private
146
enforcement).
When the legislature structures a private enforcement regime, in
addition to creating a private right of action and identifying the set of
persons with standing, it should also consider whether plaintiffs will be
147
permitted to proceed on a representative basis. That is not the situation
in most of the United States, however. In the U.S., class actions have
proven significant sources of private enforcement across numerous
important spheres of statutory regulation, including anti-trust, securities,
148
environmental, consumer, and civil rights litigation. As discussed in
Part III, class actions are authorized on a general (trans-substantive) basis
for litigation in the federal courts by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,
as amended in 1966, and most states modeled their class action statutes
149
or rules on the federal rule. That is why we have referred to the class
action as a “wild card” in the context of private enforcement in the
145
See Thompson, supra note 6, at 185. Qui tam (“whistleblower”) statutes that
seek to protect the interests of the United States through private enforcement
present a special challenge for purposes of Article III because the private plaintiff
(“relator”) typically cannot allege personal injury. The Supreme Court solved this
problem by treating the relator as a statutory assignee of the rights of the United
States with representational standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the
assignor. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765,
771–73 (2000).
146
Between the poles of broad standing for any aggrieved private party and no
private right of action at all, there are many opportunities for a legislature to specify
with particularity the pool of potential enforcers. For example, if a legislature sought
to mobilize private enforcers against those who fraudulently label commodities, it
could confer standing on one, all, or some combination of the following potential
plaintiffs: the defrauding party’s (1) competitors, (2) customers, (3) competitors of
customers, (4) any subsequent purchaser of a commodity in the stream of commerce,
and (5) trade associations. In 1970 amendments to the National Gold and Silver
Stamping Act of 1906, which previously lacked a private right of action, Congress
elected to expressly confer standing on all five groups for the express purpose of
increasing private enforcement. See H.R. Rep. No. 91-928, at 1–2 (1970).
147
We do not address other, non-representative, forms of aggregation that may
also enable private enforcement.
148
Jack H. Friedenthal et al., Civil Procedure 758 (4th ed. 2005).
149
Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A
Preliminary View, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1439, 1500 (2008).
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150

United States. Since 1966, whenever Congress has fashioned a private
enforcement regime, it should have considered the potential impact of
class action litigation on the attainment of its regulatory goals. In
particular, it should have considered whether (1) given the enforcement
incentives provided by the common fund doctrine that we have
described—authorizing payment of attorneys’ fees and expenses out of
the fund created by the class litigation—other such incentives were
necessary or appropriate, and (2) additional private enforcement
incentives aside, class litigation might yield inefficient over-enforcement.
Congress has not consistently done so, but it is deemed to legislate
151
against the background of the Federal Rules. As a result, there have
been some obvious instances of potential over-enforcement, notably
152
under the Truth-in-Lending Act, prompting some federal courts to balk
at the idea of certifying a class to collect statutory damages and Congress
to amend the statute in order to cap the potential recovery in class
153
suits. Attempts by states to achieve similar protection against inefficient
over-enforcement of state law or otherwise to pursue a different vision of
the class action than that captured in federal law have recently suffered
dual setbacks, first with the enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of
154
2005, which sweeps most consequential class litigation on matters of
155
state law into federal court, and more recently by a Supreme Court
decision that appears to prevent federal courts from honoring state law
156
limitations on class actions.
As we discussed in Part III, the policies that can reasonably be said to
support representative litigation vary depending on claim type. In the
scenario in which statutory violations produce a large number of small
injuries, compensation may not be a plausible goal, but the absence of
representative litigation can render the violator, as a practical matter,
immune from suit by private parties. Class actions thus can deter
unlawful conduct of would-be violators by eliminating a structural
157
economic impediment to private enforcement. At the same time as it

150

Stephen B. Burbank, International Civil Litigation in U.S. Courts: Becoming a
Paper Tiger?, 33 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 663, 666 (2012).
151
See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979).
152
Pub. L. No. 90-321 , 82 Stat. 146 (1968).
153
See, e.g., McCoy v. Salem Mortg. Co., 74 F.R.D. 8 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Ratner v.
Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y 1972); Rodriguez v. Family
Publ’n Serv., Inc., 57 F.R.D 189 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Edward J. Rubin, Legislative
Methodology: Some Lessons from the Truth-in-Lending Act, 80 Geo L.J. 233, 237, 305–06
(1991).
154
Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4.
155
See Burbank, supra note 149, at 1447.
156
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010); see
also Burbank & Wolff, supra note 11.
157
See Stephen C. Yeazell, Civil Procedure 963 (5th ed. 2000); Clayton P.
Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1027, 1049–51
(1990).
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reduces the per claim cost of counsel, the class device can also elevate the
quality of representation by markedly increasing the stakes (and
potential rewards) of a case by aggregating damages, thereby justifying
greater investment of lawyer time and resources into effective private
158
enforcement.
The haphazard way in which legislatures, federal and state, have
structured private enforcement regimes against the background of
general (trans-substantive) class action provisions is of greatest concern
with respect to negative value claims and within that category the subset
159
of truly small claims. As to the latter, because compensation is usually
not a plausible objective (depending on how small the claims are),
whether or not class litigation should be permitted for the purpose of
deterrence should depend, first, on the animating goals of the
substantive law, and second on the desired level of enforcement, both of
160
which the Supreme Court has chosen to ignore. Indeed, because
Congress has been relatively uninvolved in federal class action policy, it
may not consistently consider the potential of representative litigation to
skew regulatory objectives when structuring a private enforcement
161
regime.
2. The Provision of Incentives for Enforcement
Effectively mobilizing private enforcement requires provision of
adequate incentives. Simply allowing private enforcement, without
attending to incentives, may result in under-enforcement in substantive
areas of law in which those injured lack the resources to serve as private
enforcers even if they have a substantial claim, or in which the costs of
prosecuting claims exceeds their value. As we have discussed, the class
action device can provide at least a partial answer to this problem with
respect to some kinds of regulatory issues, but a great many violations of
statutory law and administrative regulations are too individualized for
class treatment under American law. Similarly, in situations where a claim
under a statute or administrative regulation can yield a substantial
158
See Eric D. Green, Advancing Individual Rights Through Group Justice, 30 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 791, 797–98, 802–03 (1997); David L Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as
Party and Client, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 913, 927–28 (1998).
159
See Henry N. Butler & Jason S. Johnston, Reforming State Consumer Protection
Liability: An Economic Approach, 2010 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 94–99 (2010).
160
See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 11, at 20.
161
However, it has done so in some instances. Congress has limited remedies
available in class actions under a number of statutes, including the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act, Expedited Fund Availability Act, Homeowners Protection
Act, Truth in Lending Act, Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, Electronic Fund Transfer Act, and Migrant and Seasonal Worker
Protection Act. Brief for Respondent at App. A, Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (No. 08-1008), 2009 WL 2777648, at *1A.
That appendix also lists many representative examples of state statutes limiting
remedies available in class actions, and another appendix lists representative state
statutes that prohibit the use of class actions for particular types of claims.
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individual recovery, the acceptability of percentage-based fees in the
United States, which we discussed in Part III, may obviate the need to
provide additional incentives. But many such claims hold no prospect of
a recovery adequate to attract a lawyer practicing on a percentage-fee
basis. The two primary types of statutory rules that can be used to
incentivize private enforcement are those allocating responsibility for
costs and attorneys’ fees and those governing available remedies.
We focus here on allocation of responsibility for attorneys’ fees,
although the same logic applies to other litigation costs. In Part III we
discussed the “American Rule,” pursuant to which each party pays its own
attorneys’ fees and the “English Rule,” pursuant to which the loser pays
most of the winner’s attorneys’ fees. As compared to the two-way fee
shifting of the English Rule, it is also possible to provide one-way fee
shifting in favor of plaintiffs or in favor of defendants. One-way fee
shifting in favor of plaintiffs has grown considerably in statutory
regulation since the late 1960s, including in the areas of civil rights and
162
consumer law. One-way fee shifting in favor of defendants is extremely
163
rare in practice. The Supreme Court has referred to plaintiffs’ fee shifts
as “congressional utilization of the private-attorney-general concept,”
while noting that “under some, if not most, of the statutes providing for
the allowance of reasonable fees, Congress has opted to rely heavily on
private enforcement to implement public policy and to allow counsel fees
164
so as to encourage private litigation.”
We quoted excerpts from a review of the current state of theoretical
and empirical knowledge about fee shifting in Part III, noting that, with
rare exceptions, the effects and hence the comparative advantages and
165
disadvantages of the American Rule and the English Rule are unclear.
The problem, according to Avery Katz, is that “[l]egal costs influence all
aspects of the litigation process, from the decision to file suit to the
choice between settlement and trial to the question whether to take
precautions against a dispute in the first place,” which can affect the

162

See Farhang, supra note 2, at 94–128. Although the language of some of these
provisions in federal legislation provides for fee awards to the “prevailing party,”
literally reflecting the English Rule, based upon their assessment of legislative intent,
courts have read most such provisions as effectively creating one-way fee shifting for
plaintiffs, allowing prevailing plaintiffs to recover fees as a matter of course, and
allowing prevailing defendants to recover fees only upon a showing that the plaintiff’s
claim was frivolous or brought in bad faith. Id. at 82. The federal Copyright Act is a
rare exception. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 519 (1994). For Texas
departures from the American Rule, see supra note 52.
163
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 139, 141 & n.8 (1984).
164
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 263 (1975).
165
See supra text accompanying note 56.
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number of underlying opportunities for litigation. Changing the rules
governing legal fees thus “remedies some externalities while failing to
167
address and even exacerbating others.”
Scholars disagree about the comparative merits of the American and
English Rules. However, from the standpoint of the incentives facing
plaintiffs and their attorneys, it is clear that, as compared to either rule,
no matter who wins under a one-way plaintiff’s shift, expected costs of
suit will be equal or less, causing the expected value of the case to be
168
Thus, among the alternative arrangements for
equal or greater.
allocating responsibility for paying attorneys’ fees, the one-way plaintiff’s
169
shift creates the greatest incentives for private enforcement.
Available remedies for legal violations can also provide important
incentives for enforcement, and this is clearest with respect to economic
remedies, although non-economic remedies can provide important
incentives as well. Available economic remedies for statutory violations
are, to an important extent, the function of a statute’s express provisions.
Legislators have wide latitude to determine whether statutory cases, if
won by plaintiffs, will be worth no money, a little money, or a lot of
money. They can enact express statutory provisions that confer monetary
damages greater than a plaintiff’s actual damages, such as double, triple,
or punitive damages. Double or triple damages operate as multiples of
the actual monetary damages suffered by the plaintiff, and punitive
damages can be awarded separately in an amount that need not be tied
170
to actual monetary harm at all, and can far exceed it. Legislators can
also provide “statutory damages,” which are a specific sum awarded either
in lieu of or in addition to actual damages, an approach typically taken to

166
Avery Wiener Katz, Indemnity of Legal Fees, in 5 Encyclopedia of Law and
Economics: The Economics of Crime and Litigation 63, 64 (Boudewijn Bouckaert
& Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
167
Id. at 65.
168
Under the American Rule the plaintiff knows that expected liability for
attorneys’ fees will be her own expected fees whether she wins or loses. Under the
English Rule (or at least the indemnity version which provides full reimbursement)
the plaintiff knows that expected fees will be zero if she wins, since the defendant will
have to pay her fees, and will be her own expected fees, plus the defendant’s
expected fees, if she loses. Under a one-way plaintiff’s shift, the plaintiff knows that
her expected fees will be her own expected fees if she loses, and will be zero if she
wins. Thus, if the plaintiff loses, she is in the same position as if she loses under the
American Rule (she pays her own fees), and better off than under the English Rule.
If the plaintiff wins, she is in the same position as if she won under the English Rule
(the defendant pays her fees), and better off than under the American Rule.
169
See Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under
Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. Legal Stud. 55, 60–61 (1982);
Frances Kahn Zemans, Fee Shifting and the Implementation of Public Policy, 47 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 187, 190 (1984).
170
See G. Robert Blakey, Of Characterization and Other Matters: Thoughts about
Multiple Damages, 60 Law & Contemp. Probs. 97, 110–11, 123 (1997); Galanter &
Luban, supra note 143, at 1426.
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incentivize private enforcement where actual damages are small or
difficult to establish, and one used most often by Congress in the context
171
of consumer protection and intellectual property regulation. Courts
have recognized that damages enhancements “are justified as a ‘bounty’
172
that encourages private lawsuits seeking to assert legal rights.” Like
plaintiffs’ fee shifts, using damages enhancements as a “bounty” operates
to “reward individuals who serve as ‘private attorneys general’ in bringing
173
wrongdoers to account,” and provides an “incentive to litigate” that is
174
“designed to fill prosecutorial gaps.”
We note that Congress has sometimes incentivized private
enforcement by using damages enhancements in conjunction with fee
shifting. In some policy contexts, fee shifting alone will not be sufficient
175
to generate private enforcement of meritorious claims. This is so
because of delay lawyers experience in receiving payment of fees,
uncertainty of case outcome (both in terms of success and amount of
recovery), and, sometimes, difficulty in recovering fees by winning
176
plaintiffs. Since litigation regularly entails both delay and uncertainty of
outcome, attorneys discount anticipated fee awards accordingly. A forprofit sector attorney weighing only economic considerations will not
represent plaintiffs on the expectation of a fee award if she also has the
opportunity to be paid at a comparable rate, in a timely fashion, and not
contingent on prevailing. Further, courts have at times interpreted
prevailing plaintiff fee shifts—on such issues as what attorney work is
covered, what constitutes “prevailing,” appropriate hourly rates, and the
171
See Sheila B. Scheuerman, Due Process Forgotten: The Problem of Statutory Damages
and Class Actions, 74 Mo. L. Rev. 103, 103–04, 110–11 (2009); Victor E. Schwartz &
Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts, 54 U. Kan. L.
Rev. 1, 61 (2005). In combination with class actions, statutory damages can create
massive liability, inefficiently high levels of private enforcement pressure, and overdeterrence. See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 11, at 65 n.200; Scheuerman, supra, at
111. However, a recent Ninth Circuit decision rejected the “enormity” of damages in
a class action under a consumer protection statute with a statutory damages provision
as a reason to deny class certification. Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d
708, 710–11 (9th Cir. 2010). The court maintained that, while there was no evidence
of congressional intent in the case at hand, under the Supreme Court’s decision in
Califano, see supra text accompanying note 151, Congress is deemed to legislate
against the background of the Federal Rules (including Rule 23) absent clear
expression to the contrary. Id. at 716.
172
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 58 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also
United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 937 (4th Cir. 1979); TVT Records v. Island Def
Jam Music Grp., 279 F. Supp. 2d 413, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
173
Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 403 (5th Cir. 1986); see
also Perrone v. Gen. Motors Accep. Corp., 232 F.3d 433, 440 (5th Cir. 2000).
174
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 493 (1985).
175
See Farhang, supra note 2, at 190–91; Thompson, supra note 6, at 216.
176
See Federal Courts Study Committee, Judicial Conference of the
United States, Tentative Recommendations For Public Comment 50 (1989); see
generally Federal Courts Study Committee, Judicial Conference of the United
States, Report of The Federal Courts Study Committee 25, 104–05 (1990).
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relevance of the proportionality of the fee to the outcome achieved—in
177
ways that produce awards below market rates. Deploying damages
enhancements in conjunction with fee shifting can allow contingency
arrangements to counteract the discounting of fees that results from
delay and uncertainty of outcome regarding both the case and, if
successful, the fee award.
In our discussion of structuring private enforcement regimes, we
have focused on formal access to private enforcement and direct
economic incentives for it. Of course, many other aspects of a regulatory
statute, and of the legal system in which it is implemented, can affect the
probability that a plaintiff will succeed in litigation, which has
straightforward influence on the expected value of claims. For example, a
plaintiff’s probability of successful litigation—and therefore the extent of
private enforcement—can be powerfully influenced by rules governing
178
179
180
evidence,
burdens and standards of proof,
and, as
liability,
181
182
discussed in Part III, pleading and discovery. Thus, the operation of
private enforcement regimes hinges on the interplay of a complex array
of rules at the levels of both the individual statute and the civil justice
system, and we have just highlighted what we take to be the most
important ones.
D. The Influence of Political Institutions on the Choice of Private Enforcement
As noted in Part II, in recent years, scholars studying the role of
litigation in American policy implementation have argued that American
separation-of-powers structures create incentives for Congress to rely on
private enforcement litigation for policy implementation. This literature
argues that in the American institutional environment Congress has
incentives to rely on private enforcement regimes to carry out its will in
the face of potential resistance by (1) Presidents, (2) future legislative
majorities, and (3) bureaucrats whose interests or preferences are not
aligned with the goals of the enacting Congress. This institutional
environment also frequently gives rise to the need for broad
supermajoritarian coalitions to pass a law, and privatization of
enforcement costs in a regulatory law is one strategy to achieve this goal.

177

See Federal Courts Study Committee, Report of the Federal Courts
Study Committee, supra note 176, at 25, 104–05; Ray Terry, Eliminating the Plaintiff’s
Attorney in Equal Employment Litigation: A Shakespearean Tragedy, 5 Lab. Law. 63, 66–67
(1989).
178
See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Multidefendant Settlements: The
Impact of Joint and Several Liability, 23 J. Legal Stud. 41, 42 (1994).
179
See Farhang, supra note 2, at 27–28.
180
See Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 431–33 (4th ed.
2004).
181
See Burbank, supra note 18.
182
See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal
Discovery, 23 J. Legal Stud. 435, 435–36 (1994).
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Before elaborating on these institutional explanations, we briefly
return to more widespread cultural explanations for “litigiousness” in the
U.S., also noted in Part II, intending to highlight how they contrast
with—although they are not necessarily in conflict with—the institutional
factors. One dimension of the cultural argument is about Americans in
general, and a second dimension is about a transformation in American
political culture since the late 1960s. The argument about Americans in
general is tied to the perspective of “American exceptionalism”—which
holds that American political culture differs fundamentally from other
183
developed nations. One strand of this view maintains that in the U.S.
individualist and antistatist orientations give rise to “a society profoundly
rooted in law,” with a “potent orientation toward individual rights,”
fostering “the American eagerness for legal settlements to disputes . . .
184
[and] excessive litigiousness.” Against this general backdrop, scholars
have argued that a cultural transformation occurred beginning around
the late 1960s that resulted in a greater propensity among Americans to
185
assert legal rights. This account is marked, alternately, by tropes of
degeneration and tropes of triumph.
The degenerative story of transformation is one of cultural decline
from a rights-respecting people to a rights-abusing one. According to this
view, Americans became afflicted with a “national disease” that prevented
them from “tolerat[ing] more than five minutes of frustration without
186
submitting to the temptation to sue.” During this period, Americans’
traditional (and healthy) respect for individualism, with long roots in the
American political tradition, transmuted into the hyper-individualism of
187
rabid “rights talk,” legalism, and litigiousness. As we note in Part II,
however, “Notwithstanding a decades-long organized campaign by
American business to demonize lawyers and litigation, there is robust
empirical evidence supporting Kagan’s observation that ‘[m]any,
188
Further, serious
perhaps most Americans are reluctant to sue.’”
empirical scholars have not been able to confirm a “litigation explosion”
across American court systems as a whole during this period, though, as
discussed below, there was a sharp increase in the rate of private
189
enforcement of federal statutes in the late 1960s.

183

E.g., Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged
Sword 17–18 (1996).
184
Id. at 270; see also Anthony King, Ideas, Institutions and the Policies of
Governments: A Comparative Analysis: Part III, 3 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 409, 418 (1973).
185
See, e.g., Eric Foner, The Story of American Freedom 299–305 (1998).
186
Jerold S. Auerbach, A Plague of Lawyers, Harper’s, Oct. 1976, at 37, 42; see also
Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 Nw. U. L. Rev. 767, 767 (1977).
187
See Garry, supra note 138, at 7–8; Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The
Impoverishment of Political Discourse x–xi (1991).
188
Supra text accompanying note 33 (quoting Kagan, supra note 21, at 34).
189
See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31
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The triumphal story of transformation—rather than disease—
apprehends the emergence of an assertive polity advocating an expansive
understanding of individual rights and demanding that powerful
institutions respect them. Shaped by both the civil rights movement—
beginning with race, but expanding well beyond it—and a Supreme
Court that elaborated expansive understandings of rights, the American
people developed a heightened state of “rights consciousness,” and
190
increasingly turned to courts to vindicate them.
In contrast with these cultural explanations for the extent of
litigation in American policy implementation, more recent institutional
scholarship emphasizes the importance of separation-of-powers
structures. A core and perennial feature of American separation of power
structures—conflict between Congress and the President over control of
the administrative state—encourages Congress’s purposeful and
extensive reliance on private enforcement regimes to implement its
policy enactments. Recognizing that command-and-control regulation
entails a choice between bureaucracy and litigation, or some
combination of the two, scholars making this argument build,
theoretically, on scholarship seeking to understand the conditions that
motivate Congress to limit and curtail administrative power. In a series of
noted articles, Terry Moe argues that when delegating to agencies,
American legislators make choices about agency structure, procedure,
and power meant to insulate their preferences from other governmental
actors who threaten, or might threaten in the future, to subvert them,
most importantly the President, who possesses a variety of means to
191
influence agency behavior. Empirical research has demonstrated that,
in fact, under conditions of divided party government (different parties
controlling Congress and the presidency) legislators enact more detailed
laws, thus limiting agency discretion in implementation, and place more
structural constraints on the exercise of bureaucratic implementation
192
authority.
This institutional logic—for delegating less authority to the
bureaucracy and structurally constraining its exercise of the powers
delegated—can also motivate Congress to enact private enforcement

UCLA L. Rev. 4, 69 (1983); Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46
Md. L. Rev. 3, 37 (1986).
190
See Michael Schudson, The Good Citizen: A History of American Civic
Life 291 (1998); see generally Foner, supra note 185, at 299–305.
191
See Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in Can the Government
Govern? 267, 277–79 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989) [hereinafter
Moe, Bureaucratic Structure]; Terry M. Moe, Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the
Story, 6 J.L. Econ. & Org. 213 (1990) [hereinafter Moe, Political Institutions]; Moe &
Caldwell, supra note 135, at 176.
192
See Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 122, at 131; Huber & Shipan, supra
note 122, at 37.
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193

regimes. To the degree that an enacting Congress is concerned about
whether the President will enforce statutes according to legislative goals,
due to the distinct imperatives of his office, or due to his own ideological
preferences, Congress has reason to enact incentives for private enforcers
to do so. Adequately incentivized, private lawsuits can operate as an
enforcement mechanism with an autopilot character, substantially
beyond executive control.
Consistent with this theory, Congress has been more likely to enact
incentives for private enforcement when the opposing political party
194
controls the executive branch. This fact is important in explaining the
steep increase in private lawsuits in the implementation of federal
statutes since the late 1960s. Between President Nixon assuming office in
1969 and the end of the twentieth century, the U.S. experienced divided
government 81% of the time, as contrasted with 21% in the period
195
between 1901 and 1968. At the same time, the ideological distance
196
between the two dominant political parties steadily increased. The
surge in both divided government and party polarization during this
period led to growing legislative-executive conflict; Congress turned
increasingly to private litigants to enforce its regulatory policies, and the
rate of private federal statutory lawsuits exploded by about 800% between
197
President Nixon assuming office and the end of the twentieth century.
From the standpoint of an enacting Congress, other threats to
bureaucratic enforcement of statutes arise from future Congresses with
potentially different preferences (legislative coalition drift), and from
bureaucrats themselves (bureaucratic drift). Future congressional
coalitions may exercise bureaucratic oversight powers—via oversight
hearings, investigations, and budget control—to subvert bureaucratic
198
enforcement of the enacting Congress’s policy goals. The alternative of
private enforcement regimes provides a form of autopilot enforcement,
via market incentives, that will be substantially insulated from
199
interference by future legislative majorities. This strategy of insulation
assumes, of course, that such future legislative majorities will not simply
pass a new law to achieve their goals.

193
See Burke, supra note 19, at 14–16; Melnick, supra note 102, at 400; Ginsburg
& Kagan, supra note 117, at 6–7.
194
See Farhang, supra note 2, at 216.
195
Id. at 222.
196
See Nolan McCarty et al., Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology
and Unequal Riches 1 (2006); Gary C. Jacobson, Partisan Polarization in Presidential
Support: The Electoral Connection, 30 Cong. & Presidency 1, 1–2 (2003).
197
See Farhang, supra note 2, at 66, 221–23.
198
See Eskridge, supra note 134, at 1129–73; Moe, Bureaucratic Structure, supra
note 191, at 277–79; Moe, Political Institutions, supra note 191, at 223; Moe & Caldwell,
supra note 135, at 176.
199
See Burke, supra note 19, at 173–74; Kagan, supra note 21, at 49; Farhang,
supra note 2, at 79–81, 166, 225, 233.
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The strategy is made effective by the stickiness of the status quo that
is characteristic of the American lawmaking system, which arises from the
multitude of actors that the system empowers to kill legislation—
Presidents, courts, two legislative chambers, an elaborate committee
system within each chamber that disproportionately empowers
200
committee members and chairs, and the filibuster in the Senate. In a
lawmaking system with so many gatekeepers, as Moe states, “Whatever is
201
Under this constraint, private
formalized will tend to endure.”
enforcement regimes are considerably more insulated from future
legislative coalitions than bureaucratic enforcement regimes. Empirical
research shows that, in fact, when the majority party in Congress faces an
impending loss of seats in the next election, it is more likely to enact
202
private enforcement regimes.
The threat of bureaucratic drift arises from the prospect that
bureaucrats may pursue their own interests at the expense of the
enacting Congress’s preferences, leading to bureaucratic shirking of
delegated work, capture of the bureaucracy by the regulated population,
careerism, and bureaucrats’ pursuit of their own policy preferences
203
rather than those of the elected officials who empowered them. The
stickiness of the status quo exacerbates this problem because it creates
significant latitude for bureaucrats to move policy (cause it to drift) away
from the preferences of the elected branches, before all necessary players
in the lawmaking process will have the incentive and ability to coordinate
204
their actions in a legislative reversal. In contrast, the autopilot character
of private enforcement, sufficiently incentivized, insulates the
205
enforcement function from the problem of bureaucratic drift. As
discussed in Part V.B, concerns about bureaucratic drift have contributed
to reliance on private enforcement in civil rights regulation in the U.S.
The many veto points that characterize America’s fragmented
lawmaking institutions encourage enactment of private enforcement
regimes for an additional reason. Research focusing on institutional
fragmentation in the American lawmaking process has emphasized the
ways in which the multitude of veto points truncate, limit, and curtail

200
See David W. Brady & Craig Volden, Revolving Gridlock: Politics and
Policy from Jimmy Carter to George W. Bush 20 (2d ed. 2006); Sven H. Steinmo,
American Exceptionalism Reconsidered: Culture or Institutions?, in The Dynamics of
American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations 106, 127 (Lawrence C. Dodd
& Calvin Jillson eds., 1994); R. Kent Weaver & Bert A. Rockman, Assessing the Effects of
Institutions, in Do Institutions Matter?: Government Capabilities in the United
States and Abroad 1, 3 (R. Kent Weaver & Bert A Rockman eds., 1993).
201
Moe, Political Institutions, supra note 191, at 240.
202
See Farhang, supra note 2, at 76–81.
203
See McCubbins et al., supra note 112, at 246–47.
204
See Cross, supra note 134, at 1303–04; McCubbins et al., supra note 112, at 246–47.
205
See Burke, supra note 19, at 173–74; Kagan, supra note 21, at 49; Farhang,
supra note 2, at 225.
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206

ambitious policy initiatives. Summarizing this literature, Sven Steinmo
concludes that an American lawmaking system “replete with veto
points . . . gives huge power to interests wishing to stop, alter, or modify
governmental action,” and consequently by the time controversial or
ambitious policy initiatives “wheedle their way through the labyrinth and
past so many veto points,” they often will have been scaled back to satisfy
207
multiple gatekeepers.
This institutional environment has consequences for legislative
choices concerning the mobilization of public versus private power in
pursuit of legislative goals, and for the expenditure of public money. A
number of studies of the American welfare state have argued persuasively
that, as compared to direct governmental expenditures on publicly
funded welfare state programs, laws privatizing the delivery of social
benefits—such as through tax incentives for private employment-based
benefit plans—are more likely to attract the broad cross-party support
208
necessary to clear the labyrinth of veto points in the lawmaking process.
One reason for this is that raising tax revenue for new spending is
frequently, and certainly increasingly, controversial. Like the legislative
creation of incentives for the private provision of benefits to achieve
welfare state goals, the legislative creation of incentives for private
litigation to achieve regulatory state goals, by reducing or eliminating the
need to raise tax revenue, can facilitate the broad coalition-building
209
necessary to enact a new regulatory law.
V. Examples of Enforcement Regimes
A. Why the Sectoral Approach?
As we discussed in Part I, the desire to avoid “abstract speculation” and
the need to make our account of private enforcement manageable are
important reasons why, early on, we decided to take a sectoral approach,
choosing a few areas to study from a much longer list (which itself is not
exhaustive) of legal domains in which private enforcement plays a role.
Equally important, however, is our conviction, also discussed in Part I, that

206
See, e.g., Sean Farhang & Ira Katznelson, The Southern Imposition: Congress and
Labor in the New Deal and Fair Deal, 19 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 1, 1 (2005); Victoria C.
Hattam, Labor Visions and State Power: The Origins of Business Unionism in
the United States (1993); Robert C. Lieberman, Shifting the Color Line: Race
and the American Welfare State (1998).
207
Steinmo, supra note 200, at 126.
208
See Jacob S. Hacker, The Divided Welfare State: The Battle over Public
and Private Social Benefits in the United States 43–44 (2002); Christopher
Howard, The Hidden Welfare State: Tax Expenditures and Social Policy in
the United States 9–10 (1997).
209
See Burke, supra note 19, at 15–16; Farhang, supra note 2, at 154–55; Melnick,
supra note 102, at 399–400.
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regulatory design has to be tailored to the particular social and legal contexts
in which unremedied systemic problems arise.
Private enforcement of government-initiated or sanctioned policy
potentially covers a virtually limitless array of policy areas, from areas such as
anti-discrimination law (employment, housing, education, access to public
facilities, etc.) through banking regulation, consumer protection,
environmental protection, labor relations, occupational safety, and public
health. We have identified almost 400 distinct enforcement regimes specified
210
Table 1 summarizes
in federal legislation between 1947 and 2002.
information on the nature of those enforcement regimes. As the table shows,
24% of the enforcement regimes include private enforcement mechanisms,
although only about one-tenth of those rely exclusively on private
211
enforcement.
As suggested by Table 1, many areas of regulation could involve private
enforcement in one way or another. The specifics of regulation and
regulatory enforcement (the enforcement regime) vary from area to area.
There is no reasonable way to provide a comprehensive overview of the
specifics of regulation in all, or even many, of the areas in which private
enforcement is used. Consequently, we have chosen to focus on two specific
areas: employment discrimination and consumer protection vis-à-vis unfair or
deceptive acts and practices (UDAP). In the former, federal law provides a
primary role for private enforcement while in the latter, private enforcement
212
is largely through state law, at least with regard to general UDAP statutes.
Our selection of these two areas was somewhat arbitrary, although our hope
was that we would find useful bodies of empirical research to inform our
discussion. Although this hope was fulfilled to a significant degree for
employment discrimination (at least for enforcement under federal statutes),
we were disappointed by the limited empirical research we found regarding
UDAP statutes. As we will discuss, although there is a healthy empirical
literature on the experience of consumer problems and the actions taken
with regard to those problems, there is little research focused specifically on
UDAP enforcement (or that even allows one to separate out UDAP issues
from ordinary consumer problems with malfunctioning or unsatisfactory
products). Although a substantial number of the problems consumers
experience might be due to deceptive or unfair practices by sellers, most of
the research is framed simply in terms of consumer dissatisfaction with
products or services, and what consumers do to redress those dissatisfactions.

210
Sean Farhang identified these enforcement regimes in 333 laws passed by
Congress between 1947 and 2002 that David Mayhew has labeled as “important”
legislation. David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking,
and Investigations, 1946–2002, 52–73 (2d ed. 2005).
211
See infra Table 1.
212
There are many specialized statutes at the federal level dealing with areas such
as banking, credit, and debt collection, that do provide for private enforcement, but
our decision was to focus on enforcement of the general UDAP statutes rather than
the specialized statutes.
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TABLE 1. Federal Regulatory Enforcement Regimes; 1947–2002
PS with
Private PS with
Suits
(PS)
All Regimes

24

Fee

PS with

Fee Shift

Damages

and

Pure
Govt

Admin

Shifts* Enhance* Enhance* Suits Sanctions

73

33

26

65

68

Pure Govt

Hybrid

Private Enfor. (suits (priv &

Number
of

Suits

or admin)

pub)

Regimes

3

76

21

623

SOCIAL v. ECON

N=623

Economic
Regulation

20

61

50

36

63

71

4

80

16

142

27

76

29

24

65

67

3

73

23

467

Social
Regulation

BY POLICY AREA

N=609**

Labor

41

60

75

5

59

36

92

Communications

39

86

54

4

61

36

28

Civil Rights

34

70

52

0

66

35

58

Environmental
Consumer
Protection

34

68

78

4

66

30

50

30

76

67

3

70

27

33

Banking

28

60

81

7

72

21

43

Energy

18

82

65

0

82

18

17

Transportation
Public Health &
Safety

19

38

69

6

81

13

16

17

60

79

0

83

17

42

Elections
National
Security

9

68

55

0

91

9

22

8

100

62

0

92

8

13

Food and Drug

0

54

89

0

100

0

37

Aviation
Securities/
Commodities

0

83

78

0

100

0

12

0

54

71

0

100

0

35

Other

22

61

56

6

78

17

125
N=623

* The denominator for these percentages is the number of regimes with private civil actions, not total regimes.
**14 observations could not be characterized as social or economic regulation.

Notes to Table 1
Laws coded are from the Mayhew “important legislation,” which
totaled 333 laws from 1947–2002. These laws are deemed by Mayhew to
be the most significant pieces of legislation in the postwar period
according to criteria discussed in Divided We Govern (Mayhew, supra note
210). Of the 333 laws, 189 were found to have regulatory provisions
(defined broadly to mean mandatory commands/prohibitions). These
189 laws contained 795 enforcement regimes—distinct sets of regulatory
commands within the law governed by distinct enforcement provisions.
The unit of analysis in the table is the enforcement regime. Excluded
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from the 795 regimes are 172 observations for which administrative
rulemaking was the only implementation provided, or for which the law
did not provide any enforcement for the prohibitions. This yielded
623 regimes with enforcement provisions, which is the data reflected
in the table.
Below are the definitions of the column headings:
Private Suits: Percentage of regimes that provide for private civil suits,
including ones that also provide for government enforcement.
Fee Shifts: The percentage of Private Suits with fee-shifting provisions,
including awards to prevailing plaintiff, prevailing party, or any party.
Damages Enhancements: The percentage of Private Suits with damages
enhancements, defined as double, triple, statutory, punitive, or
exemplary damages.
Fee Shifts AND Damages Enhancements: The percentage of Private Suits
with fee shifts AND damages enhancements.
NOTE: The above four percentages are not provided in the table
broken down by specific policy areas because the number of observations
with private rights of action at the level of individual policy areas is
insufficient for the proportions with fees and damages to be meaningful.
Government Suits: Percentage of regimes in which the Attorney
General or an administrative agency may bring a lawsuit (whether for
civil or criminal penalties).
Administrative Sanctions: Percentage of regimes with administrative
sanctions, including civil penalties, inspections, recalls, license
revocation, citations, seizure, cease and desist, injunctions, and equitable
relief. A large majority, but not all, of these contained express
authorizations for administrative hearings.
Pure Private Enforcement: Percentage of regimes with Private Suits but
NO government enforcement (no Government Suits or Administrative
Sanctions).
Pure Government Enforcement: Percentage of regimes with Government
Suits and/or Administrative Sanctions, but NO Private Suits.
Hybrid: Percentage of regimes with Private Suits, alongside Government
Suits and/or Administrative Sanctions.
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In the section of the table broken down by social and economic
regulation, the two types are defined as follows: Social regulation
typically cuts across different industries and sectors, and is generally
aimed at problems of externalities and public goods, the promotion of
public health and safety, consumer protection, environmental
protection, equal opportunity, and quality of life. Economic
regulation typically targets the regulation of markets and industries,
working to promote market stability, efficiency, and competition.
Excluded from this table were 14 observations that could not be
classified as either social or economic regulation (they mainly
addressed national security).
B. Employment Discrimination
1. The Statutory Framework
The foundational decisions about implementation of federal job
discrimination laws were made in the landmark Civil Rights Act (CRA)
of 1964. CRA’s Title VII bars job discrimination based on race,
gender, national origin, or religion, and relies on a hybrid
enforcement framework including both private and public
213
enforcement, and both administrative and judicial process. It is,
however, primarily dependent on private lawsuits for enforcement. We
first lay out the current rules governing Title VII enforcement, and in
a subsequent section we discuss what motivated legislators to construct
this statutory enforcement framework, as well as how the framework
has evolved over time.
A person wishing to pursue a job discrimination claim under Title
VII must first file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
214
Commission (EEOC). The EEOC provides notice to the accused
employer and conducts a preliminary investigation to ascertain
whether there is “reasonable cause” to believe the statute has been
violated. If it reaches a finding that no reasonable cause exists, the
agency notifies the parties and issues the complainant a “right to sue”
215
letter, and he or she is free to bring a civil action in federal court. If
the agency does find reasonable cause to believe that the statute was
violated, it attempts to facilitate a voluntary settlement of the dispute
216
through an informal process of conciliation. The EEOC lacks the
authority to issue enforceable orders based on its findings. If the agency is
unsuccessful in bringing about a settlement, it is authorized to act as

213

Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253-66 (1964) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17) (2006).
214
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006).
215
Filing a Lawsuit, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, http://www.eeoc.gov/
employees/lawsuit.cfm.
216
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006).
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prosecutor in a federal civil action on behalf of the employee, or, in
the alternative, the agency will issue the complaining party a right to
sue letter. If the claimant elects to file a private suit in federal court,
proceedings are “de novo,” and available remedies under the current
version of Title VII include injunctive relief, back pay, compensatory
and punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees, and plaintiffs seeking
217
compensatory or punitive damages are entitled to trial by jury.
A number of other federal statutes provide additional protections
against and remedies for job discrimination. The Rehabilitation Act of
1973, prohibiting employment discrimination based on disability by
the federal government and federal contractors, and the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, prohibiting employment discrimination
based on disability in the private sector and by states, simply
incorporated Title VII’s enforcement and remedial provisions by
218
Such claims are thus governed by the enforcement
reference.
framework set forth above. The Equal Pay Act of 1963 (barring pay
discrimination against women) and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (barring job discrimination against persons
age 40 or older) also follow a largely private enforcement model, with
219
a similar administrative process as described above. Two federal civil
rights laws passed during the Reconstruction period also provide some
220
protections from job discrimination. The Civil Rights Act of 1866
guaranteed newly freed slaves the right that “is enjoyed by white
citizens” to make and enforce contracts, which was interpreted by
courts beginning around 1970 to prohibit race (and only race)
221
discrimination in private employment. The Civil Rights Act of 1871,
providing a cause of action against state actors for the violation of any
federal rights, encompasses within its vast scope suits by state
employees against state governments for violation of constitutional
rights, including discrimination in the terms and conditions of
222
employment in violation of the equal protection clause. With respect
to enforcement of these statutory provisions, the Civil Rights Act of 1871
contains an express private right of action, while the Supreme Court

217
Remedies for Employment Discrimination, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity
Comm’n, http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/remedies.cfm.
218
Rehabilitation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006)); Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No.
101-336, § 107, 104 Stat. 327, 336 (1990).
219
Equal Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006)); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L. 90-202,
81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006)).
220
Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006)).
221
See Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970); Waters v.
Wis. Steel Works of Int’l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476, 483 (7th Cir. 1970).
222
Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)); see
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690–92 (1978).
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implied a private right of action under the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
Neither statute authorizes the federal government to prosecute
enforcement actions in court, nor has either statute been amended to
provide for administrative evaluation of claims. These Reconstruction
civil rights laws can provide a number of significant benefits in
addition to those conferred by the other federal employment
discrimination statutes, including more extensive economic damages,
longer statutes of limitations, and coverage of a broader range of
224
employment relationships.
The federal statutes governing job discrimination are overlaid by
a set of state statutes of varying substantive reach and heterogeneous
enforcement provisions. Every U.S. state but Alabama has statutory
prohibitions against job discrimination on the grounds regulated by
225
Some
Title VII (race, national origin, gender, and religion).
important differences between state and federal law arise where state
statutes go beyond federal statutes and provide additional protections
226
and remedies.
There are also significant differences in enforcement provisions.
Of 28 states with fair employment practice laws in 1964 (i.e., preexisting Title VII), 21 used the administrative cease-and-desist model,
4 used only criminal and no civil sanctions, and 3 lacked enforcement
227
provisions and were strictly voluntary. None contained a private
228
right of action. As state job discrimination statutes spread across the
nation after 1964, they continued to rely heavily on administrative
authority, but they shifted toward a hybrid approach in which private
lawsuits would also play a significant role, and this shift included
amending many pre-1964 state statutes to add private rights of
229
action. All state laws provide that an agency or department will
230
Most states have fair
handle complaints of discrimination.
223

Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1975).
See Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Elizabeth J. Norman, Civil Rights Law and
Practice 11–19 (2d ed. 2004).
225
See ELT, 50-State Survey of Discrimination Laws, http://www.elt.com/resources/
integrity-suite/discrimination-laws/.
226
See John F. Buckley & Ronald M. Green, 1998 State by State Guide to
Human Resources Law (1998); George Rutherglen, Employment Discrimination
Law: Visions Of Equality In Theory And Doctrine 244–47 (3d ed. 2010).
227
See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Legislative History of Titles VII
and XI of Civil Rights Act of 1964 5–6 (1968) [hereinafter EEOC]; Bureau of
Nat’l Affairs, State Fair Employment Laws and Their Administration: Texts,
Federal State Cooperation, Prohibited Acts 4 (1964).
228
Farhang, supra note 2, at 85.
229
Sean Farhang, Private Lawsuits, General Deterrence, and State Capacity: Evidence
from Job Discrimination Litigation 2–3 (U.C. Berkeley, Goldman School of Public Policy
Working Paper No. GSPP10-009, 2010) (on file with author).
230
See General Accounting Office, Office of the General Counsel, SexualOrientation-Based Employment Discrimination: States’ Experience With
Statutory Prohibitions 6 (1997), http://www.gao.gov/assets/90/87121.pdf.
224

2013]

PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT

691

employment practice commissions with far greater administrative
power than the EEOC, typically including the authority to adjudicate
claims, issue cease-and-desist orders, and provide a broad range of
remedies, including injunctive relief, monetary damages, and
231
attorneys’ fees. A large majority of states have incorporated private
232
enforcement into their job discrimination statutes.
2. Legislative Motivations for Creating the Title VII Framework
Recent scholarship has investigated the motivation behind
Congress’s massive reliance on private litigation, with very modest
administrative powers, in the implementation of federal job
discrimination laws, starting with Title VII of the CRA of 1964, and
escalating in the CRA of 1991 when Title VII was last importantly
233
amended. We draw on this work for the summary account provided
below. Consistent with the discussion of separation-of-powers
institutions in Part IV.D, the evidence shows that ideological and
institutional conflict between Congress and the President has
repeatedly—over time, in many different areas of civil rights, and
across multiple configurations of party control of Congress and the
presidency—been a central cause of Congress’s self-conscious
mobilization of private lawsuits at the expense of administrative
234
power. It also shows that the combination of fear of bureaucratic
drift and concern about the public expense of administrative
implementation has encouraged reliance on private enforcement.
In 1964, liberal civil rights advocates wanted a job discrimination
enforcement regime centered on strong administrative adjudicatory
powers, modeled on the National Labor Relations Board, with no
private lawsuits. This preference was reflected in the job
235
discrimination bill initially introduced by liberal Democrats. At the
time, the Democratic party, which held a majority in both chambers,
was sharply divided over civil rights, with its southern wing deeply
committed to killing any job discrimination (or other civil rights) bill.
In light of these insurmountable intraparty divisions, passage of the

231

See Buckley & Green, supra note 226, at 4–138; Rutherglen, supra note 226,

at 246.
232
See Andrea Catania, State Employment Discrimination Remedies and Pendent
Jurisdiction Under Title VII: Access to Federal Courts, 32 Am. U. L. Rev. 777, 819–32
(1983); Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Opening the Doors to the Local Courthouse:
Maryland’s New Private Right of Action for Employment Discrimination, 9 U. Md. L.J. Race
Religion Gender & Class 7, 7–8 (2009); General Accounting Office, supra note
230, at 6–7.
233
See Farhang, supra note 2, at 94–128.
234
Id. at 78.
235
A Bill to Prohibit Discrimination in Employment in Certain Cases Because of
Race, Religion, Color, National Origin, Ancestry or Age, H.R. 405, 88th Cong. (1963).
See Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, III. Procedure Under Title VII, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1195, 1196 n.7, 1250–75 (1971).
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CRA of 1964 depended on conservative Republicans joining non236
southern Democrats in support of the bill.
Wielding the powers of a pivotal voting bloc, conservative
Republicans stripped the EEOC of the strong administrative powers
initially proposed by advocates of the job discrimination title, and
provided instead for private lawsuits with economic incentives for
237
enforcement, including attorney fee awards for prevailing plaintiffs.
Generally opposed to bureaucratic regulation of business,
Republicans also feared that they would not be able to control an
NLRB-style civil rights agency in the hands of their ideological
238
However, in a political
adversaries in the executive branch.
environment marked by intense public demand for significant civil
rights legislation, some meaningful enforcement provisions were
necessary, and to conservative Republicans private litigation was
preferable to public bureaucracy, especially in the hands of the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations, which they thought would be
overzealous enforcers and would pursue an excessively liberal
implementation program. Thus, conservative Republican support for
Title VII was conditioned on a legislative deal that traded private
239
Plaintiffs’ economic recoveries
lawsuits for public bureaucracy.
would be limited to back pay and attorneys’ fees, and cases would be
tried to judges rather than juries.
This choice, grounded in fear among pivotal legislators that the
President would commandeer a powerful agency to pursue his own
policy agenda, had long-run transformative effects on the
enforcement preferences of civil rights advocates. They had initially
been sanguine about agency implementation and dubious about the
effectiveness of private enforcement of Title VII, even with attorney
fee awards for prevailing plaintiffs. Their skepticism about private
enforcement was based in considerable measure on the longrecognized gross under-enforcement of Reconstruction era civil rights
laws, which relied exclusively on private enforcement (although they
did not allow for recovery of attorneys’ fees). However, developments
regarding enforcement in the decade following passage of the CRA of
1964 did not match civil rights advocates’ expectations. In the late
1960s, they observed a severely underfunded agency lacking the basic
material resources necessary to carry out its mission. They also
witnessed a bureaucratic enforcement apparatus apparently not
committed to using its administrative capacity, however limited, for
240
aggressive enforcement. Even aside from resource issues, the federal
236

See Farhang, supra note 2, at 94.
Id. at 95.
238
Id. at 101.
239
Id. at 118.
240
See David L. Rose, Twenty-Five Years Later: Where do We Stand on Equal
Employment Opportunity Law Enforcement?, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1121, 1133–39 (1989).
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bureaucracy appeared to them lethargic, establishment-oriented,
politically timid, and vulnerable to capture. The situation grew
markedly worse when President Nixon assumed office in 1969. The
executive branch became more conservative, and civil rights liberals
began to attack it openly, claiming that it was willfully sabotaging civil
rights enforcement by the federal bureaucracy.
Alongside this waning faith in the administrative state, civil rights
liberals observed levels of private enforcement that far exceeded their
expectations, as well as courts inclined toward broadly pro-plaintiff
interpretations of Title VII. The 1964 CRA’s attorney fee provisions
had the effect of contributing funds to civil rights groups that
prosecuted lawsuits, bolstering their litigation programs and
enforcement capacity. Critically, it also brought into being a private,
for-profit bar to litigate civil rights claims in general, and job
discrimination claims in particular. Civil rights groups came to view
the private civil rights bar as a valuable enforcement infrastructure to
be cultivated and leveraged through fee-shifting rules.
These developments drove an inversion of civil rights groups’
assessment of the relative merits of private litigation versus public
enforcement, strengthening the former and weakening the latter.
They mobilized to extend the fee-shifting provisions of Title VII across
the entire field of civil rights as a way to bolster enforcement and
obviate dependence on the (then Nixon-Ford) federal bureaucracy,
which they regarded as not just feeble, but hostile. They secured from
allies in a Democratically-controlled Congress the extension of
241
statutory fee shifting to school desegregation cases in 1972, to voting
242
rights cases in 1975, and then to all other civil rights laws still
lacking a fee shift in the omnibus Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards
243
Act of 1976. The latter law added fee-shifting provisions to the Civil
Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871, both of which, as discussed above, have
244
been construed to provide causes of action for job discrimination. In
the early 1970s interest group advocacy to extend the private
enforcement model of Title VII (introduced by conservative
Republicans) went beyond civil rights to embrace environmental,
consumer protection, and “public interest” regulation in general.
Thus, over roughly a decade following the passage of the 1964
CRA, fee shifting was expanded and became an entrenched part of
job discrimination and other civil rights laws. The resulting
privatization of implementation costs contributed significantly to the
broad support these laws attracted from legislators in both political
parties. By the early 1970s budget deficits emerged as a politically

241
242
243
244

Emergency School Aid Act, Pub. L. No. 92-318 § 718, 86 Stat. 354, 369 (1972).
Voting Rights Act of 1975, Pub. L. No 94-73 § 402, 89 Stat. 400, 404 (1975).
Pub. L. No 94-559 § 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976).
See supra text accompanying notes 221–22.
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salient issue, strengthening the hand of conservatives wanting to
oppose new governmental interventions that would entail spending
on bureaucracy, and increasing incentives for all legislators to
privatize the costs of regulatory enforcement by relying on private
245
enforcement regimes. In debates over civil rights implementation in
the early to mid 1970s, the budgetary efficiency of private rights of
action coupled with fee shifting emerged as a key justification on
which Democrats and Republicans could agree. This efficiency
justification dovetailed naturally with an anti-bureaucracy theme: fee
shifting does not add to the federal budget, and it does not grow the
federal bureaucracy, legislators in both parties argued in unison.
A major moment of development in Title VII’s enforcement
246
regime occurred with the CRA of 1991, when Congress built on Title
VII’s private enforcement framework by adding compensatory and
punitive damages, and the right to trial by jury, thereby substantially
increasing the volume of private enforcement. The CRA of 1991 was
ultimately the result of growing ideological polarization between the
President and Congress on civil rights policy (among many other
policy issues). The legislative choice was encouraged by policy conflict
in the sphere of civil rights throughout the 1980s between a
predominantly Democratic Congress and the Reagan administration,
including an acrimonious struggle over control of the EEOC in
particular and the civil rights bureaucracy in general. It was fueled,
correspondingly, by ideological conflict between Congress and a
federal judiciary that grew, with the appointment of many judges by
President Reagan, increasingly to reflect the administration’s position
on civil rights.
In the summer of 1989, a newly ascendant conservative Supreme
Court majority rendered a series of decisions curtailing Title VII’s
private enforcement regime that would clearly have the effect of
247
reducing private enforcement. Civil rights groups and their allies in
Congress responded decisively by enacting the CRA of 1991, not only
overriding most of the offending court decisions, but also adding new
monetary damages and jury trial provisions with the express goal of
increasing private enforcement. Explicitly pointing to subversion of
government enforcement by EEOC leadership and the President, and
the failure of congressional oversight to remedy the situation, civil
rights advocates elected to mobilize private litigants and their
attorneys, using economic incentives, to do what the administrative
248
state would not.
245

See Melnick, supra note 102, at 399–400.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072–73
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)).
247
See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
248
See Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: The Business Necessity Standard, 106 Harv.
L. Rev. 896 (1993).
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Thus, the claim that legislative-executive competition for control
of the bureaucracy within the American separation-of-powers system
causes Congress to rely on private litigation for statutory enforcement,
as an alternative or adjunct to public enforcement, is strongly borne
out by the story of federal job discrimination legislation (and civil
rights legislation more broadly). The evidence further suggests that
concerns about bureaucratic drift—resulting from such factors as
bureaucratic laziness, timidity, or capture—also contributed to the
choice to rely on private enforcement. At times budgetary concerns
also encouraged private enforcement as an alternative to raising
revenue to underwrite administrative capacity. Finally, the events
leading to passage of the CRA of 1991 powerfully illustrate the way in
which growing ideological polarization between the political parties
(and therefore between Congress and the President during periods of
divided government) has contributed to the remarkable growth in
private enforcement litigation since the late 1960s, noted in Part IV.C.
That polarization cannot be better encapsulated than by President
Reagan’s battle with congressional Democrats over civil rights policy
in the 1980s. As discussed below, the resulting CRA of 1991 helped to
catapult job discrimination suits to their current position among the
most common types of litigation in federal court.
3. Empirical Research on Private Enforcement of Job Discrimination
Statutes
In this subsection we discuss what is known about job
discrimination litigation from empirical research focusing on (1) the
extent of job discrimination litigation, (2) whether job discrimination
litigation is an effective regulatory tool, and (3) whether it is an
effective vehicle to provide relief to victims of discrimination.
Private actions enforcing federal civil rights in employment
statutes are one of the largest categories of suit reflected in statistics
compiled by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. In the
decade from 2001 to 2010, there were an average of 17,253 such suits
per year, 98% of which were privately prosecuted, with 2% prosecuted
249
by the EEOC or the Department of Justice. There are no data
available on the volume of litigation under state employment
discrimination laws that permit a nationwide assessment of how much
private enforcement exists at the state level. However, one very recent
and quite extensive study of the implementation of job discrimination
250
statutes in California does permit such an assessment. It is possible
to estimate, extrapolating from data in the study, that roughly 42,800
private job discrimination suits were filed in California state courts in
249

Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts, 2001–2010, United States Courts,
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/
FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics_Archive.aspx.
250
See Blasi & Doherty, supra note 20, at 50.
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251

the 11 years from 1997 to 2007. Data compiled by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts indicates that during the same
period there were 12,128 job discrimination suits filed in California’s
252
four federal district courts. Thus, during this period about 78% of
253
job discrimination suits in California were filed in state courts. A
work sharing agreement between the EEOC and the California agency
that handles job discrimination claims, whereby a charge can be crossfiled with both agencies while only one processes the claim, makes it
difficult to generalize from California about the balance between
federal and state job discrimination lawsuits.
This suggests that, in at least some parts of the country, state
courts are an important locus of private enforcement of job
discrimination laws. However, we think that it would be a mistake to
generalize from the case of California, for it is likely among the states
where the federal-state balance on private enforcement of job
discrimination laws is most skewed toward state court litigation.
California is among the states with much more extensive job
discrimination prohibitions than exist under federal law—including
discrimination based on association, marital status, and sexual
orientation—and its job discrimination laws reach employers that
254
have too few employees to trigger coverage by federal statutes.
Further, it is widely believed in the U.S. that plaintiffs’ lawyers tend to
regard state courts as more ideologically hospitable to their claims
than federal courts, and given California’s liberal political
environment, this is likely to be more true in California than in most
other states. Finally, it must be remembered that some states’ laws
provide no private right of action at all.

251
Our rounded estimate is based upon the following. Under California law, it is
necessary to file a complaint with the state administrative agency prior to filing a
lawsuit, but claimants are free to request a right to sue letter immediately upon filing.
There were 212,144 administrative charges of discrimination filed with the state
agency in California in the 12 years from 1997 to 2008. Blasi & Doherty, supra note
20, at 26. In order to match the period for which we have data on federal job
discrimination filings in California, discussed later in this paragraph of the text, we
subtract the mean value of one year’s filings during this period (17,679) to estimate
that 194,465 charges were filed from 1997 to 2007. Based upon sampling, Blasi and
Doherty estimate that at least 22% of these charges were followed by a private lawsuit
in state court. Id. at 11. Thus, our rough estimate is that for the period 1997 to 2007,
22% of 194,465 charges led to 42,782 state court job discrimination suits filed by
private plaintiffs.
252
Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base, maintained by the Inter-University
Consortium for Political and Social Research, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/
icpsrweb/landing.jsp.
253
Id.
254
See Marjorie Gelb & JoAnne Frankfurt, California’s Fair Employment and Housing
Act: A Viable State Remedy For Employment Discrimination, 34 Hastings L.J. 1055, 1055–
56 (1983).
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Figure 1 plots (1) the annual number of administrative charges
filed with the EEOC under all statutes that it administers, (2)
administrative charges filed under Title VII, (3) privately prosecuted
job discrimination lawsuits in federal court, and (4) such lawsuits
255
prosecuted by the EEOC or the Department of Justice. Note that the
scales for lawsuits and administrative charges are different, with the
number of suits reflected on the left y-axis, and the number of EEOC
charges reflected on the right y-axis. Prior to 1978, Title VII was the
only statute administered by the EEOC. In 1978, as noted above,
Congress shifted administration of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act from the Department of Labor to the EEOC, and
thus prior to 1978 the plots of Title VII charges and of all EEOC
charges are coextensive. After 1978 the plot of all charges begins to
exceed the plot of Title VII charges as age claims flowed into the
EEOC’s administrative system. The Americans with Disabilities Act’s
job discrimination provisions became effective in July 1992, and thus
after 1992 the plot of all EEOC charges begins to exceed the plot of
Title VII charges by a wider margin as disability claims flowed into the
EEOC’s administrative system.
The statutory bases for the lawsuits in the figure include all the
statutes mentioned in the last paragraph, and also suits brought under
the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871, which have no EEOC filing
requirement. The number of job discrimination suits mainly sloped
upward from 1970 to 1983, with a plateau in the middle of that
period; gradually declined from 1983 to 1991; shot up sharply from
1991 to 1997; and has declined since then, possibly plateauing in the
last few years. Regarding the post-1991 rise, as we discuss below, the
CRA of 1991’s addition of new damages and jury trials to Title VII is
clearly part of the cause. The 1992 effective date for the Americans
with Disability Act’s employment provisions also contributed, bringing
a new type of claim into the legal system. The post-1997 decline is
notable, but we hazard no explanation for it here; it is susceptible to
many theoretically plausible accounts among which we cannot
adjudicate.

255
Data for the EEOC charge figures for 1970 to 2002 were provided to us by the
EEOC’s Office of Research, Information and Planning, and for 2003 to 2010 they
were obtained from the EEOC’s website. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Charges,
U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/
enforcement/index.cfm. Data on job discrimination lawsuits for the years 1970 to
2000 were drawn from the Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base, supra note 252, and
for the years 2001–2010 they were drawn from Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts, 2001–
2010, produced by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
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FIGURE 1: Trends in Job Discrimination Litigation
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Several studies have evaluated the effects of the CRA of 1991’s
amendments to Title VII—which added compensatory and punitive
damages, and jury trials—on private enforcement activity. Farhang
examined the influence of the CRA of 1991 on the volume of private Title
256
VII charges filed with the EEOC from 1980 to 2002. As previously
discussed, such administrative filings are a legal precondition to filing an
action in federal court, although they do not reveal whether a court action
was subsequently filed:
A substantial proportion of federal employment discrimination
claims are settled after an EEOC charge is filed because of the threat
257
of litigation, but without formal litigation being instituted. Indeed,
it is well-recognized that potential liability ‘in the shadow of the law,’
without formal legal action, profoundly shapes whether and how
258
cases settle without litigation.

256

See Farhang, supra note 14, at 16–18.
Id. at 16. No data exist that would allow an estimate of the percentage of
EEOC charges that are dropped by claimants after the administrative proceeding in
the absence of any redress offered by the respondent rather than as part of a
settlement.
258
Id.; see Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L. J. 950, 950–53 (1979).
257
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Because EEOC filings reflect the fulfillment of a formal legal
precondition to litigation, they capture both cases that ultimately enter
litigation and those that settle after the threat of litigation is invoked. The
study reports that passage of the CRA of 1991 brought about a statistically
and substantively significant increase in Title VII charges filed in all four
protected categories (gender, race, national origin, and religion). In
259
aggregate, it increased total Title VII complaints by 58%. Farhang and
Spencer evaluate the impact of the CRA of 1991 on the probability that
260
Title VII plaintiffs are represented by counsel in litigation. Analyzing
cases filed in the Northern and Eastern Districts of California between
1980 and 2000, they find that the CRA of 1991 substantially increased the
probability that Title VII plaintiffs would be represented by counsel.
Consistent with the framework we set out in Part IV.C, together these
studies show that provisions in private enforcement regimes affecting the
value of claims can significantly influence both the volume of private
enforcement activity, and the ability of claimants to obtain counsel.
There is also a body of work investigating the effects of job
discrimination litigation on the organizations sued, primarily with an eye
to assessing whether litigation is an effective regulatory tool (we discussed
the theoretical debate surrounding this issue in Parts IV.A and B). There is
substantial literature in organizational sociology evaluating the ways in
which organizations have responded to civil rights laws prohibiting
employment discrimination. It has produced considerable evidence that
passage of Title VII of the CRA of 1964, and subsequent job discrimination
laws modeled on it, caused the development and diffusion of formal rules,
policies, and positions that were ostensibly calculated to reshape personnel
decision-making in organizations to improve compliance with equal
261
employment opportunity laws, or at least the appearance of it. Such
policies include, for example: efforts aimed at increasing objectivity in
evaluating employee performance, setting pay, and awarding promotions;
policies providing for formal internal review of complaints of employment
discrimination, among other grievances; programs for training managers
and staff about compliance with civil rights laws; and policies formally
establishing responsibility for improving opportunities for women and
racial minorities in the workplace. This literature acknowledges and
grapples with the question of whether such formalized employment
259

Farhang, supra note 14, at 26–27.
See Sean Farhang & Douglas Spencer, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Economic
Recovery Rules and Attorney Representation in Job Discrimination Litigation,
Presentation at American Law & Econ. Assoc. (May 19, 2012), available at
http://www.dougspencer.org/workingpapers/FarhangSpencer-ALEA.pdf.
261
See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures:
Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 Am. J. Soc. 1531, 1537 (1992);
Alexandra Kalev et al., Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate
Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 Am. Soc. Rev. 589, 590, 595 (2006); John R.
Sutton & Frank Dobbin, The Two Faces of Governance: Responses to Legal Uncertainty in
U.S. Firms, 1955 to 1985, 61 Am. Soc. Rev. 794, 798–99 (1996).
260
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policies actually improve employment opportunities for protected groups,
or are just symbolic gestures calculated to make employers appear fair and
provide them a defense in the event of litigation.
In characterizing the body of research on the regulatory efficacy of job
discrimination lawsuits, it is useful to distinguish between specific
deterrence and general deterrence effects of enforcement activity. Specific
deterrence refers to the effects on the future conduct of the target of
enforcement, while general deterrence refers to the effects of aggregate
levels of enforcement activity on the future conduct of members of the
regulated population, whether or not they have actually been the target of
enforcement.
Studies of the specific deterrence effects of job discrimination
litigation have not distinguished private actions from those prosecuted by
government officials, nor have they distinguished federal from state court
lawsuits. Rather, their primary research design has been to compare
organizations that had been subject to any job discrimination lawsuit with
those not previously subject to suit, in order to assess whether being sued
caused organizations to adopt policies calculated to improve compliance
with job discrimination laws, or whether they actually increased the
proportion of women and racial minorities in managerial positions
subsequent to suit. The earliest such studies evaluated whether
organizations that had been sued were more likely to have policies
ostensibly aimed at compliance with job discrimination laws than
organizations that had not been sued. The studies found no specific
262
deterrence effects. However, as Edelman points out, comparisons across
organizations subject to suit and those not subject to suit are problematic
because, although those subject to suit may be prodded into undertaking
compliance efforts, the worst violators may be more likely to be sued,
263
making it difficult to disentangle the countervailing effects.
More recent studies of specific deterrence have avoided this problem
by deploying research designs and methods that evaluate the effects of job
discrimination suits within organizations over time, and they have also used
the actual proportion of women and racial minorities in managerial
positions, rather than the adoption of formal compliance policies, as their
264
dependent variable. These studies do find specific deterrence effects.
Examining a large sample of private organizations spanning many
industries, Dobbin and Kalev find that organizations that have been targets
of job discrimination lawsuits subsequently increased the proportion of

262

See, e.g., Edelman, supra note 261, at 1563–64; Allison M. Konrad & Frank
Linnehan, Formalized HRM Structures: Coordinating Equal Employment Opportunity or
Concealing Organizational Practices?, 38 Acad. Mgmt. J. 787, 807 (1995).
263
See Edelman, supra note 261, at 1550.
264
E.g., Kalev & Dobbin, supra note 13, at 857; Sheryl Skaggs, Producing Change or
Bagging Opportunity? The Effects of Discrimination Litigation on Women in Supermarket
Management, 113 Am. J. Soc. 1148, 1160–61 (2008).
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265

women and racial minorities in management. In a study focusing on the
supermarket industry, Skaggs finds that corporations targeted by sex
discrimination lawsuits subsequently increased representation of women in
266
managerial positions in stores operated by the corporation.
Other studies have investigated the general deterrence effects of job
discrimination lawsuits. In the earliest study of this sort that we found,
Leonard analyzed changes in employment demographics between 1966
and 1978, and found that the number of class action Title VII suits
(aggregating public and private prosecutions) within a state and against a
defendant in a particular industry was significantly associated with
employment market gains for African Americans within that state and
267
industry. Leonard’s findings point to the general deterrence effects of
class action cases, but they do not speak to the effects of (vastly more
prevalent) individual suits, or to the issue of the efficacy of private
litigation as distinct from prosecutions by governmental actors.
Two recent studies attempt to investigate the issue of general
deterrence and job discrimination litigation with attention to geographic
variation, and both find general deterrence effects. Charles Epp, studying a
large sample of local governmental employers, finds that litigation
“support structures” in the local community—measured as the size of the
bar in the locality specializing in suits against government—were
significantly and positively associated with state governmental employers’
propensity to adopt serious measures directed at compliance with
268
prohibitions against workplace sexual harassment. The U.S. Supreme
Court has recognized workplace sexual harassment as a form of gender
269
discrimination that violates Title VII, and it is a substantial source of Title
VII claims. The compliance measures that Epp analyzed included policies
requiring the investment of resources, such as grievance procedures,
270
employee training, and oversight by legal staff. It seems reasonable to
assume that lawyers specializing in suits against the government will be
composed entirely, or almost entirely, of private sector lawyers. This
finding held in an empirical model that controlled for whether an
271
employer had actually been sued. Although Epp does not include in his
model a direct measure of aggregate litigation activity in the relevant
geographic area, his measure of lawyer specialization in the relevant

265

Kalev & Dobbin, supra note 13, at 883.
Skaggs, supra note 264, at 1174.
267
See Jonathan S. Leonard, Antidiscrimination or Reverse Discrimination: The Impact
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practice area interestingly captures the potential for litigation to be
mobilized against violators.
Farhang analyzes a sample of primarily private organizations and
assesses explanations for their adoption of employment policies that are
both ostensibly designed to increase employment opportunities for women
and racial minorities, and that also have been demonstrated, in another
study, to actually increase the proportion of women and racial minorities
272
in managerial positions. The policies are affirmative action plans with
concrete goals and timetables, the creation of at least one full-time position
responsible for equal employment opportunity compliance within the
organization; and the establishment of committees and task forces with
responsibility for improving opportunities for women and racial minorities
273
within the organization. The study parses privately prosecuted from
governmentally prosecuted federal lawsuits, and tests the general
deterrence hypothesis by evaluating the influence of rates of private
federal job discrimination litigation at the level of the federal judicial
274
district. It finds, controlling for whether an organization has actually
been sued, that higher rates of policy adoption by organizations are
associated with higher rates of private federal job discrimination litigation
275
in the districts in which they have offices. Together, the Leonard, Epp,
and Farhang studies arrive at similar conclusions using a variety of
different research designs and measurement strategies. All three studies
find general deterrence effects associated with higher levels of private
enforcement.
Finally, two empirical studies have attempted to assess how well job
discrimination plaintiffs fare in the litigation process. Both examined
federal job discrimination litigation, and both reached the conclusion that
276
job discrimination plaintiffs fare badly. Clermont and Schwab’s strategy
of evaluation is to compare job discrimination suits to the rest of the civil
277
docket in aggregate. They find that job discrimination suits, as compared
to the mean rates for all other civil cases aggregated together, are less likely
to settle early, to win on summary judgment, to win at trial, or to win on
278
appeal.

272

See Farhang, supra note 229, at 2–3, 12–13, 29; Kalev et al., supra note 261, at 590.
Kalev et al., supra note 261, at 590.
274
There are 94 federal districts.
275
See Farhang, supra note 229, at 26–27.
276
See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 429, 429 (2004); Laura
Beth Nielsen et al., Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment
Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. Empirical Legal
Stud. 175, 176, 188 (2010).
277
See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 276, at 429–30.
278
Id. at 440–41. It bears noting here that all civil litigation other than job
discrimination is quite a broad category (which includes contracts disputes, securities,
antitrust, banking, consumer, labor, and environmental litigation, among many other
273
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Nielsen, Nelson, and Lancaster analyze a large nationwide sample of
Title VII cases filed in federal district courts between 1988 and 2003, and
279
they provide a detailed portrait of litigation outcomes. They report that:
x 19% of cases are dismissed;
x of cases that continue (81% of overall filings), 50% are settled
prior to the filing of a summary judgment motion;
x of cases that reach summary judgment (31% of overall filings),
plaintiffs lose 57% of the time;
x of cases that survive summary judgment (14% of overall filings),
57% settle prior to trial; and
x of cases that continue to trial (6% of overall filings), plaintiffs
prevail 33% of the time.280
The study authors sought to identify settlement amounts, but they were
able to do so in only 75 of 945 cases in their sample that had settled; the
281
median settlement amount for those 75 cases was $30,000. We note that
the mean settlement value reported is based on only 8% of the settled
cases in the sample, and it seems quite possible that there is selection bias
at play in whatever process led to disclosure of the settlement figures for
282
that 8%.
C. Protecting Consumers from Unfair or Deceptive Acts and Practices
1. Legal Structure
Dissatisfied consumers may be able to seek redress on a number of
grounds. These include common law express and implied warranties,
common law fraud, and actions under statutes specifically designed to
protect consumers from unfair or deceptive acts and practices (including
deceptive advertising), either broadly or targeted to specific types of
products or services. Our focus here is on the enforcement of general
unfair and deceptive acts or practices statutes (UDAP).
The “granddaddy” of these statutes is the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) Act, originally passed in 1914, which declared unlawful “unfair or
283
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” The FTC Act
created procedures to be followed by the Commission along with penalties
types). It is not entirely clear why lower rates of success on the dimensions they
measure in the area of job discrimination amount to a “sad story,” as they put it.
279
See Nielsen et al., supra note 276, at 176.
280
Id. at 184–87.
281
Id. at 187.
282
For example, if larger settlements are more likely to be governed by
confidentiality stipulations—because employers don’t want publicity of large payouts
to encourage litigation against them, or to signal guilt of the charges of
discrimination—then the $30,000 figure could be downward-biased to a significant
extent.
283
Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-203, § 5, 37 Stat. 717
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006)).
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the Commission could impose if it found persons, partnerships, or
corporations in violation of the Act. Importantly, although the
Commission could act on the receipt of complaints of possible violation of
the FTC Act, that statute did not, and still does not, generally authorize
private rights of action; that is, beyond complaining to the Commission,
there is no provision for private enforcement under the FTC Act. There
are other, more targeted federal statutes that do authorize private rights of
action; a good example is the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act which
specifically authorizes private action and provides for actual damages plus
284
up to $1,000 additional damages (for an individual bringing an action )
285
and reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses.
Because of the limited nature of the enforcement procedures
authorized by the FTC Act and the inclination of the FTC to focus on
issues with broad, national import, the general enforcement of measures to
protect consumers from unfair and deceptive acts or practices not dealt
with in a federal statute targeted to a particular set of products or services
is left primarily to state law. This is illustrated by the widely reported filing
of a lawsuit against McDonald’s by a mother in California and the Center
286
for Science in the Public Interest in December 2010; the suit alleged that
McDonald’s practice of including toys in its “Happy Meals” constituted a
deceptive practice intended to circumvent parental control and teach
287
children unhealthy eating habits. The action was filed in California state
court under several California statutes including California’s False

284

15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2006). In class actions, the statutory penalty can be up to
the lesser of $500,000 or 1% of the net worth of the debt collector. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692k(a)(2)(B) (2006).
285
Other federal statutes authorizing private rights of action include the Truth in
Lending Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1616 (2006)), Consumer Leasing Act (15 U.S.C.
§ 1667 (2006)), Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006)), Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2006)), Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 12
U.S.C. §§ 2601–2617 (2006)), Homeowner’s Protection Act (12 U.S.C. §§ 4901–4910
(2006)), and the Truth in Savings Act (12 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4313 (2006)). Many of
these statutes also include public enforcement provisions, often delegating that
authority to the FTC.
286
The filing of the suit was reported on several national broadcast outlets
including National Public Radio, April Fulton, Consumer Group Sues McDonald’s Over
Happy Meal Toys, NPR (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2010/
12/15/132078519/consumer-group-sues-mcdonalds-over-happy-meal-toys, as well as
in newspapers both in the U.S. and in other countries. For example The Guardian’s
Sunday partner, The Observer, covered the case. Dominic Rushe, McDonald’s Sued for
Tempting Californian Mum’s Daughter with Happy Meals Toys (Dec. 18, 2010), The
Observer, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/dec/19/mcdonalds-happy-mealssued-california; the Financial Times also ran a story on the case, Greg Farrell,
McDonald’s Sued over Happy Meals (Dec. 15, 2010), Financial Times, http://www.
ft.com/cms/s/0/36c6170a-0875-11e0-80d9-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2Loky5gER.
287
Farrell, supra note 286; Rushe, supra note 286.

2013]

PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT

705

Advertising Law, all of which, unlike federal statutes, authorize private
288
rights of action.
All of the 50 states have some form of general statute dealing with
289
UDAP issues, often referred to as “little FTC Acts.” These acts vary from
290
state to state, with regard both to scope and to enforcement provisions. A
2009 report prepared for the National Consumer Law Center (NCLC)
describes these variations and provides a chart summarizing some of the
291
key differences among the states which we include as an Appendix. As of
July 1, 2009, all states provided for some measure of private enforcement,
although several states limit when private enforcement may be undertaken
(e.g., only when certain vulnerable groups are affected, or only when there
292
is some evidence of “public” impact). The NCLC report makes clear that
the nature of the enforcement regime varies from state to state. All states
(except for Iowa, where there was no private enforcement at the time the
293
report was prepared ) allow consumers to recover compensatory
294
damages. Many states provide for multiple or punitive damages and/or
295
statutory damages (i.e., set amounts unrelated to actual damages), and
288

Amended Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Unfair Competition
Law, The Consumers Legal Remedies Act and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1,
Parham v. McDonald’s Corp., No. CGC-10-506178 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2012), 2011 WL
162213; see Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204 (West 2008); Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750–
1780 (West 2009).
289
See Henry N. Butler & Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer Protection Acts Really
Little-FTC Acts?, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 163, 169–73 (2011) (describing the development of
state consumer protection laws and their variation); Carolyn L. Carter, Consumer
Protection in the States: A 50-State Report on Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices Statutes, 5
(2009) National Consumer Law Center, http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/car_sales/
UDAP_Report_Feb09.pdf.
290
See Butler & Wright, supra note 289, at 169–73.
291
Carter, supra note 289, at 7–10. For a more detailed analysis of the individual
state statutes, see Consumer Protection in the States, Appendix B: State-by-State Summaries of
State UDAP Statutes, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr. (2009), http://www.nclc.org/images/
pdf/udap/analysis-state-summaries.pdf. For an earlier effort to compile comparative
information on the strength of enforcement regimes under state deceptive trade
practices legislation, see Anthony Paul Dunbar, Comment, Consumer Protection: The
Practical Effectiveness of State Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 59 Tul. L. Rev. 427
(1984).
292
Iowa was the last state to provide for private rights of action, with that state’s
law (Iowa Code § 714H (2012)) taking effect on July 1, 2009. 2009 Iowa Acts ch. 167,
H.F. 712, §§ 1-8.
293
The Iowa statute referenced in the previous footnote provides for an award of
attorneys’ fees to a prevailing consumer and, if the finder of fact “finds by a
preponderance of clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence that a prohibited
practice or act in violation of this chapter constitutes willful and wanton disregard for
the rights or safety of another, in addition to an award of actual damages, statutory
damages up to three times the amount of actual damages.” Iowa Code § 714H.5(4)
(2012).
294
Carter, supra note 289, at 7–10.
295
For a description and analysis employing this data set, see Joshua D. Wright,
Searle Civil Justice Institute, State Consumer Protection Acts: An Empirical
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many also provide for attorneys’ fees for consumers who prevail in their
296
297
claims. Many states specifically allow class actions under their statutes,
and many allow consumers to seek compensation or damages without
having to prove that they have in some way relied on the deceptive
information the seller provided. Because of the state-by-state variation, it is
difficult to make meaningful generalizations about UDAP private
enforcement regimes beyond the point that they vary.
Based on the information from the NCLC report (shown in our
Appendix), we can say something about variation in the strength of
enforcement regimes by focusing on the strength of the remedies for
consumers in each state (shown in the bottom panel of our Appendix). We
have counted the number of “strong” remedies in each state, counting
“mixed or undecided” elements as .5, producing a score that ranges from 0
to 7. Figure 2 shows the distribution of these scores, with one dot
representing each state. What is evident is that using the National
Consumer Law Center’s ratings, most states have relatively strong private
enforcement regimes. We also looked to see if the variation among the
states correlated with some key political indicators. We found modest
correlations with a measure of citizen liberalism (0.20) and with a measure
298
of states’ tendency to adopt innovative policies (0.38).

Investigation of Private Litigation: Preliminary Report (2009)
http://ssrn.com/paper=1708175.
296
About half the states allow a prevailing defendant to recover its attorneys’ fees,
but for 22 states this is restricted to cases in which the plaintiff’s claim is determined
to be frivolous or malicious; 5 states allow two-way fee shifting in consumer cases
without limiting shifts to the defendants to cases where the plaintiff had in some
sense behaved badly (this information is from the Searle Center data set,
supplemented by the authors). Alaska, which is the only American state with a
general fee-shifting system, allows for recovery of a fraction of a prevailing party’s
fees; where the plaintiff’s claim is determined to be frivolous or the plaintiff brought
the action to “obtain a competitive business advantage,” the court can award “full
reasonable attorney fees at the prevailing reasonable rate.” Alaska Stat.
§ 45.50.537(c) (2012). Regarding Alaska’s fee-shifting system, see Susanne Di Pietro
& Teresa W. Carns, Alaska’s English Rule: Attorney’s Fee Shifting in Civil Cases, 13 Alaska
L. Rev. 33 (1996) (describing the history and application of fee shifting in Alaska).
297
Presumably class actions would be permitted in other states under general
procedural rules providing for class actions unless a statute specifically provided
otherwise.
298
The citizen liberalism measure is from William D. Berry et al., Measuring
Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States, 1960–93, 42 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 327,
327–31 (1998); the measure of innovation is from Jack L. Walker, The Diffusion of
Innovations Among the American States, 63 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 880, 882–83 (1969). One
might object that a rating created by the National Consumer Law Center reflects a
“pro-consumer bias.” Yet, scores we created have a substantial correlation (.477) with
an index created by researchers at the Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and
Economic Growth at the Northwestern University School of Law (an organization
that appears to be more on the pro-business side) that measures aspects of state
consumer protection laws that reflect both “benefits” and “restrictions” from the
viewpoint of plaintiffs in consumer actions. See Wright, supra note 295. The Searle
Center measure, which coded state consumer protection laws in effect in 2004,
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Given the variation among the states, one would think that they
presented a natural laboratory for assessing the impact of enforcement
regimes with varying characteristics. Unfortunately, to our knowledge there is
no such research. The core problem is measuring the impact of the
enforcement regimes because states do not collect in any kind of comparable
fashion information on enforcement activities, either in the form of
complaints to consumer protection agencies or lawsuits brought under
299
UDAP statutes.
300

2. Empirical Research on Private Enforcement Regarding Consumer Problems
The empirical literature on consumer protection issues does not single
out unfair and deceptive practices for specific attention. Rather, that research
focuses generally on consumer problems and dissatisfaction. There is some
correlated 0.30 with the measure of citizen liberalism and 0.28 with state orientation
toward policy innovation.
299
For a discussion of an earlier effort to collect such information, and the
problems of using the information that was obtained to make systematic comparisons
among the states, see Dunbar, supra note 291, at 438.
300
This section borrows generously from a recent review of empirical research
related to consumer protection. See Stephen Meili, Consumer Protection, in The
Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research 176 (Peter Cane & Herbert M.
Kritzer eds., 2010).
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scattered research related to specific problems that could be labeled unfair or
301
deceptive practices, such as disputes with securities dealers or arising from
302
used-car purchases.
The largest body of empirical research dealing with enforcement of
consumer protection laws focuses on the actions taken by consumers
themselves in response to problems with products and services. Little of this
research deals directly with the role of UDAP statutes; it deals instead with
what consumers do when they are dissatisfied. The broad category of
research is typically described as dealing with “consumer complaining,” and
303
involves work both by scholars interested specifically in consumer behavior
and by scholars approaching the question from more of a law-in-action
304
perspective. Meili summarizes the findings of research on consumer
complaining:
[One study found] the most consistent factor in determining the
likelihood of consumer complaints is problem context; [the] research
revealed a descending order of complaint probability, beginning with
non-professional services (the most likely source of complaints),
followed by products and, lastly, professional services (the least likely
source of complaints among [these] three categories). Other factors
identified in various studies include the socio-economic status of the
consumer, the significance and cost of the purchase (complaints are
likelier with respect to more expensive products and those perceived by
the consumer as more significant), the frequency with which the item is
purchased (i.e., complaints are more likely to be lodged over a less
regularly purchased item such as an automobile, rather than a
consistently purchased household item like a cleaning product), the
longevity of the problem (complaints are more likely the longer a
problem lingers), the simplicity (or perceived simplicity) of the
complaint process (the simpler the process, the more likely the
consumer is to utilize it), and whether the product was purchased on
305
credit or with cash (credit users are more likely to lodge complaints).
301
See, e.g., Jill I. Gross & Barbara Black, When Perception Changes Reality: An
Empirical Study of Investors’ Views of the Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. Disp.
Resol. 349 (2008).
302
See, e.g., Kenneth McNeil et al., Market Discrimination Against the Poor and the
Impact of Consumer Disclosure Laws: The Used Car Industry, 13 Law & Soc’y Rev. 695
(1978–79).
303
See, e.g., Ralph L. Day, Modeling Choices Among Alternative Responses to
Dissatisfaction, 11 Advances Consumer Res. 496 (1984); Joseph Barry Mason &
Samuel H. Himes, Jr., An Exploratory Behavioral and Socio-Economic Profile of Consumer
Action About Dissatisfaction with Selected Household Appliances, 7 J. Consumer Aff. 121
(1973).
304
See, e.g., Arthur Best, When Consumers Complain (1981); Jack Ladinsky &
Charles Susmilch, Major Findings of the Milwaukee Consumer Dispute Survey, in
Consumer Dispute Resolution: Exploring the Alternatives 145 (Larry Ray &
Deborah Smolover eds., 1983); Arthur Best & Alan R. Andreasen, Consumer Response to
Unsatisfactory Purchases: A Survey of Perceiving Defects, Voicing Complaints, and Obtaining
Redress, 11 Law & Soc’y Rev. 701 (1977).
305
Meili, supra note 300, at 179–80 (citations omitted).
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Meili goes on to note:
[T]he extensive empirical research on complaining behavior has
revealed that third-party dispute mechanisms are more likely to be
utilized by consumers who are wealthier, white, better educated, better
informed, younger, more inclined to view complaining in a favorable
light, not fearful of antagonizing sellers or other providers of goods and
services, more politically active, and more experienced in the particular
purchasing category . . . And . . . such mechanisms tend to . . . favor this
very group of consumers, i.e., consumers who fit into one or more of
306
these categories are more likely to prevail after complaining.
Although there is nothing specific here about actions in response to
unfair or deceptive practices, there is no reason to suspect that patterns for
those types of consumer problems would differ substantially.
A second general area of empirical research on consumer problems
deals with the dispute resolution mechanisms consumers employ when a
complaint to a seller or service provider fails to produce a satisfactory
resolution. Almost all of that research deals with administrative or private
307
dispute resolution mechanisms; little of the empirical research deals with
consumer problems, UDAP or otherwise, that reach the stage of a lawsuit.
A related point is the growth of contractually-mandated arbitration in
many of the service agreements (and some purchase contracts) that
308
consumers sign. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, contractual agreements
to take disputes to arbitration can trump rights of action in state UDAP
309
laws. Whether that is true for any specific issue depends on whether the
claim falls within the scope of the contract’s arbitration clause, a question of
law that tends to be decided on a case-by-case basis, and that has produced
310
decisions cutting in both directions. Although there is a body of empirical
311
research on consumer arbitration, none of that research focuses specifically
on issues that would be covered under UDAP laws.

306

Id. Meili also notes that there has been research on consumer complaining in
numerous countries including Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Id. at
181.
307
See id. at 183.
308
See id. at 194.
309
For example, the Supreme Court has ruled that the FAA preempts state law
holding arbitration clauses that proscribe class arbitration unenforceable. See AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011).
310
See F. Paul Bland, Jr. et al., Consumer Arbitration Agreements:
Enforceability and Other Topics 218 (6th ed. 2011).
311
For a brief review of some recent studies of consumer arbitration, see Sarah
Rudolph Cole & Theodore H. Frank, The Current State of Consumer Arbitration, 15 Disp.
Resol. Mag. 30 (Fall 2008). The most recent study, which involved very detailed
coding of about 300 American Arbitration Association consumer cases (about three
quarters of which were brought by consumers) did not describe the kinds of issues
(although it did report the types of businesses involved). See Christopher R. Drahozal
& Samantha Zyontz, An Empirical Study of AAA Consumer Arbitrations, 25 Ohio St. J. on
Disp. Resol. 843, 845–46 (2010).
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One important issue regarding private enforcement in any area is
whether the enforcement regime produces an appropriate level of
enforcement, as opposed to either under- or over-enforcement. In a recent
article, Butler and Johnston argue that current state UDAP laws produce
312
over-enforcement, which has negative consequences for consumer welfare.
These negative consequences, the authors argue, include higher prices (due
to costly precautions merchants take to avoid liability) and decreased
information available to consumers (because merchants and manufacturers
will limit their advertising to insure they do not make claims that might be
313
deemed deceptive and hence subject them to liability under UDAP laws).
In work that seeks to join theory with anecdotes, Butler and Johnston point to
some fairly notorious examples of what many would view as abusive uses of
UDAP laws, including the case of a government lawyer who sued a
neighborhood dry cleaner for $54 million under the District of Columbia
314
consumer protection law after the cleaner lost a pair of pants. Although
there appears to have been an increase in reported decisions dealing with
state consumer protection laws in both state and federal courts during the
2000s, it is well known that statistics based on reported cases are unreliable
315
indicators of patterns of litigation. Moreover, the report on which the
316
authors rely finds that there is substantial variation from state to state, with
almost half the states showing either no increase or a decline in reported
317
cases between 2000 and 2007.
Another article reports a study that sought to systematically assess
whether state consumer protection statutes extended protection beyond what
318
was provided for in the FTC Act. In this study Butler and Wright focused on
the substance of what was covered by the state acts rather than the
enforcement regimes created by the acts. Butler and Wright recruited a panel
of experts that they describe as representing a range of political perspectives;
they describe their panel as a “shadow Federal Trade Commission” because
319
several had experience at or with the FTC. The members of this shadow
FTC reviewed one-page case scenarios of representative cases that would
320
constitute potential violations of at least some state consumer statutes. The
panel members reviewed 110 case scenarios (10 of which were based on
actual FTC enforcement actions) and then indicated (1) whether the
312

See Butler & Johnston, supra note 159, at 35–52.
Id. at 47–51.
314
Id. at 6.
315
This point is acknowledged by the author of the report upon which Butler
and Johnston draw. See Wright, supra note 295, at 16–17. A further problem in
assessing the meaning of a trend showing increased reporting of cases involving a
particular issue is that there may be a more general growth in cases being reported by
Lexis (the source used in the study).
316
See id. at 21–24.
317
Id. at 24.
318
See Butler & Wright, supra note 289, at 178.
319
Id. at 178–79.
320
Id. at 178.
313
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practice was “unfair or deceptive according to FTC standards,” and (2)
“whether he or she believed the FTC would initiate an enforcement
321
action.” The results showed that of the 100 scenarios based on state cases,
the shadow FTC members found that 42 involved possible illegal conduct
under the FTC Act; they also found that all 10 of the actual FTC scenarios
322
constituted violations. Interestingly, the shadow FTC members thought that
323
only 16 of the 42 state cases would have led to possible FTC action.
From Butler and Wright’s perspective, the fact that state consumer
protection actions often sanction activities that would not be deemed illegal
under the Federal Trade Commission Act is indicative of over-enforcement at
324
the state level. Of course, one could just as easily argue that the provisions
of the FTC Act provide for inadequate enforcement. Moreover, the fact that
less than 40% of the possible illegal activities under the FTC Act would lead
to “possible FTC enforcement” suggests why the FTC Act itself, which does
not provide for private rights of action, is probably an insufficient vehicle for
enforcement of laws against unfair and deceptive trade practices.
A final issue for empirical research related to private enforcement of
UDAP laws in the United States is the role of consumer class actions.
Although consumer cases is an area where the small claims class action has
325
obvious potential as a mechanism of private enforcement, there is relatively
little empirical research on consumer class actions. Early studies focused on a
326
variety of areas other than consumer cases. Many consumer class actions
deal with UDAP issues, and hence it would be a fruitful area for empirical
research. Still, although some general studies of class actions include
327
consumer class actions, the literature on consumer cases is thin. This is
surprising given that consumer cases can involve some of the most
controversial class-action issues, such as the use of coupon settlements—
where the members of the class receive relatively trivial amounts or forms of
compensation (typically in the form of coupons for discounts on future
purchases) while lawyers representing the class receive substantial fees. In

321

Id. at 180.
Id. at 183–87.
323
See id. at 185–86.
324
See id. at 188.
325
A RAND Corporation study found that consumer cases constitute about a
quarter to a third of federal class actions. Deborah R. Hensler et al., Class Action
Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gain 8 (2001). A more recent study
of federal class action settlements found that only 12–13% were consumer cases, plus
another 6% dealing with debt collection. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of
Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. Empirical Leg. Stud. 811, 818 (2010).
326
See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 497 (1990–1991); Benjamin S. DuVal, Jr., The
Class Action as an Antitrust Enforcement Device: The Chicago Experience (II), 1976 Am. Bar
Found. Res. J. 1273 (1976); Bryant G. Garth, Power and Legal Artifice: The Federal Class
Action, 26 Law & Soc’y Rev. 237 (1992); Charles W. Wolfram, The Antibiotics Class
Actions, 1976 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 251 (1976).
327
See Hensler et al., supra note 325.
322
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fact, a recent study of federal class action settlements found that 30% of
consumer (excluding debt collection) cases involved “in-kind” relief
including vouchers, coupons, gift cards, warranty extensions, merchandise,
services, and extended insurance policies, the highest of any of the categories
328
examined. Most of these appear to be cases involving truly small claims,
which defy plausible grounding in a compensatory rationale.
We were able to locate only one empirical study focused on consumer
class actions. Meili looks at lawyers and lead plaintiffs, basing his analysis on
interviews with 33 lawyers and 20 lead plaintiffs; the former were selected
from among the membership of the National Association of Consumer
329
Advocates. The lawyers were asked to select a case they had been involved
in to discuss during the interviews; “approximately one half of the cases
involved some form of misrepresentation, fraud, or breach of contract against
mortgage companies, insurance companies, landlords and various product
manufacturers. The other half involved abusive debt collection practices,
330
credit reporting errors, or discriminatory credit terms.” The analysis that
Meili presents, which focuses on the lawyers’ goals and the relationships
between the lawyers and the lead plaintiffs, does not single out UDAP-related
331
claims for specific discussion. Still, some of his findings are interesting,
particularly the way that lawyers shaped lead plaintiffs’ goals to look beyond
their individual interests and toward the interests of the class as a whole, and
the tendency of the lawyers to conflate the client and the larger cause of
consumer rights.
VI. Conclusion
We have provided a great deal of doctrinal, normative, and empirical
information about private enforcement. Our aim has been to enhance
understanding of the historical, cultural and political background of private
enforcement, the reasons why legislators may choose a private enforcement
(or a hybrid) strategy when they sincerely wish to address an unremedied
systemic problem, and what features of both the general legal landscape and
328
Fitzpatrick, supra note 325, at 824. The next highest category was antitrust at
13%; 37% of the consumer class action settlements involved injunctive or declaratory
relief. None of the debt collection case settlements involved in-kind relief, and only
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a particular private enforcement regime are likely to determine whether that
regime is effective.
If within a single legal system, regulatory policy and strategy can only
sensibly be determined on a sectoral basis, and if the choice between public
and private enforcement (or a hybrid approach) depends on a host of
context-dependent variables, and if the efficacy of a private enforcement
regime turns on a complex of both specific and general rules and incentives,
and if traditional cultural explanations of the role that private enforcement
plays in the United States are radically incomplete because they ignore
institutional and political influences, then it is no surprise that, in the larger
project on which this Article is based, we were unable to gain substantial
comparative traction. Nor, after all, is it ground for regret. For comparative
purposes the inquiries we have pursued, the questions we have asked, the
perspectives we have brought to bear, and the data we have sought about
private enforcement in the United States are more important than the data
we have found and the answers we have secured.
Yet, some of those data and answers are suggestive for the future of
private enforcement in the United States, and both they and the perspectives
we have brought to bear raise a number of questions for the future of private
enforcement elsewhere. In concluding this Article, we offer some tentative
thoughts about both.
The frequency with which Congress has resorted to private enforcement
increased dramatically starting in the late 1960s, even after controlling for the
332
extent of regulatory legislation being passed. We noted in Part IV.D that
there was a dramatic increase in the incidence of divided government in the
twentieth century beginning with the Nixon administration, at about the
same time that the ideological distance between the parties began to widen,
and that this was associated with growing congressional reliance on private
enforcement. There were about 48 fee shifts and damages enhancements
(double, triple, and punitive damages provisions) attached to private rights of
action in federal statutes in 1968, and the number had increased to 326 by
333
century’s end, for an increase of 680%. Over the same period the rate of
334
private lawsuits enforcing federal statutes increased by about 800%. This is
not to say that Congress uses private enforcement regimes as the norm. On
the contrary, as we observed in Part V.A, in highly significant regulatory
enactments between 1947 and 2002 Congress provided for any private
enforcement of its regulatory enactments far less often than may be
commonly imagined (24% of the time), and exclusive reliance on private
335
enforcement was rare indeed (occurring less than 5% of the time).
We see little reason to believe that Congress’s reliance on private
enforcement will abate any time soon. Important variables driving this
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legislative outcome remain highly salient today. The country persists in an era
of divided government. Polarization between the political parties continues in
full flower. The scarcity of revenue to fund direct bureaucratic regulation
grows more acute. The use of counter-majoritarian legislative tactics,
necessitating broad coalition building, is virtually normal politics in the
modern American state, and such broad coalitions are, we believe, more
likely to converge on private enforcement than bureaucratic state-building,
particularly in a period when a common political slogan is that “government
is the problem, not the solution.”
It is much more difficult to assess the future of private enforcement of
statutory and administrative law at the state level largely because we know so
little about its past. While it may be reasonable conjecture to anticipate
similar patterns governing its use and effectiveness at the state level, it is clear
that far more work is necessary to produce an accurate picture of the current
state of affairs. Researchers of private enforcement have very largely focused
their attention on Congress, federal legislation, and federal litigation. The
need for research at the state level is especially pointed in a country in which
the vast majority of legislative policymaking comes out of state legislatures,
and the vast majority of litigation is handled by state courts. The similarity of
political institutions, politics, and budgetary conditions at the state and
federal levels in the U.S. suggests that the body of research on private
enforcement of federal statutory and administrative law provides a critical
starting point for work on the states. At the same time, students of legislative
regulatory policy have found that some regions of the U.S., such as the South,
have distinctive political and institutional properties that depart from the
336
federal model in important ways, counseling against hasty generalization
from federal to state regulatory regimes created through legislation. A
research agenda focused on private enforcement in the states, of course, is
not wholly separate from federal regulation. Recent expansive
understandings of federal preemption doctrine—curtailing private
enforcement of state tort law—have implications for state legislative
regulation more broadly, and thus will provide important context for the
337
study of private enforcement regimes in the states.
Just because institutional and budgetary considerations suggest that
private enforcement will remain an attractive regulatory strategy does not
mean, however, that the private enforcement regimes of the future will be
efficacious. Both Congress and the federal judiciary have taken steps to make
one oft-found element of modern American private enforcement regimes—
class action litigation—harder to maintain. Their actions may have been
motivated in part by the intent to administer a back-door remedy for
inevitable instances of over-enforcement resulting from authorizing
representative litigation on a trans-substantive basis (usually by court rule). If
336
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so, however, that would be small comfort, given that the cure is often no
more nuanced than the disease. Moreover, both Congress and the Supreme
Court have substantially impaired the power of the states to pursue different
visions of regulatory policy—whether more or less robust—through class
litigation.
We have noted the capacity of private enforcement regimes to insulate
legislative preferences from the inroads of an ideologically distant judiciary by
structuring incentives for potential litigants and their lawyers. We have also
discussed the use of remedial escalation in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as a
response to just such inroads. Much of the power and the potential mischief
of the class action derives from its traditional classification as procedure.
Effective control of procedure ensures that means are available for an
ideologically distant judiciary to frustrate legislative preferences by
constricting access to court—refashioning doctrine so as to alter the balance
of power in litigation and diminishing the incentives of those the legislature
sought to recruit as private enforcers. That certainly is a plausible way of
viewing the Supreme Court’s recent decisions on pleading that we discuss in
Part III. Moreover, notwithstanding decades of anecdotes about American
litigation that are not supported by systematic data, a realistic approach to the
American litigation model requires acknowledgment that, at least in recent
decades, the promise of access to justice has too often been broken as the
result of political decisions to starve the courts and institutionally selfregarding behavior by judges, some of whom have been quite content to use
resource constraint arguments, often in tandem with attacks on lawyers, to
disable litigants from securing rights that those judges disfavor.
Most other countries in the world are better positioned than the United
States to achieve a sensible regulatory regime, because they have not
previously abdicated key elements of regulatory design and implementation
to the bar and the judiciary, in other words, to the legal profession. As
Professor Hadfield observes:
The bar [in the United States] has by and large steered utterly clear of
the idea that it is responsible—politically responsible—for the systemwide cost and complexity of the legal system, far beyond the ethical call
to help the poor and perform pro bono work. It requires a political
process to shift perceptions—much as perceptions about the federal
government’s responsibility for high gas prices or stock market failures
are molded not in the abstract but in the crucible of political contest
and public debate.338
Thus, a key deficit of U.S. regulatory strategy may be the failure to
provide adequate public alternatives to court-based litigation for private
enforcement of statutory and administrative law. The variety of such
339
alternatives in other countries is a sobering reminder of the baneful
influence that tradition, ideology, and professional self-interest can have on
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access to justice. That fact, however, should not prevent other countries from
recognizing either the limitations of such alternatives or the social progress
that U.S. litigation systems have enabled in the past. Nor should it prevent
them from acknowledging the possibility of harnessing the generative power
of American-style litigation without replicating its destructive elements.
Ultimately, the remedy for litigation’s negative externalities is the same as in
any other market: regulation. In the case of representative litigation, as we
have indicated, the place to start is by avoiding trans-substantive regulatory
strategy.
Thinking in comparative institutional terms suggests both the limits of
the American model of private enforcement and its potential in
parliamentary democracies. Terry Moe has argued that parliamentary
regimes provide a notable contrast with the American separation-of-powers
system precisely on the issues of legislative-executive conflict and the
stickiness of the status quo that, as we suggested in Part IV.C, incentivize
340
legislative reliance on private enforcement regimes in the U.S. Moe
identifies these distinctions as an explanation for the more coherent, unified,
and centralized character of European administrative states, and the greater
policy discretion enjoyed by their leadership, as compared to the American
341
administrative state. He offers this explanation of the comparative structure
of the American administrative state in response to James Q. Wilson’s noted
lament of the weakness of American bureaucracy as compared to those in
342
parliamentary democracies.
Moe suggests that, from the standpoint of legislators, executive
subversion of implementation is not a problem in parliamentary regimes;
the executive arises out of the legislature and both are controlled by the
majority party. Thus, unlike in the United States, the executive and the
legislature do not take distinctive approaches to issues of structure; they
do not struggle with one another in the design and control of public
agencies; they do not push for structures that protect against or
compensate for the other’s political influence.343
Likewise, in parliamentary regimes, coalition drift does not present a
significant incentive to formalize into law rules and procedures meant to
insulate bureaucratic power from manipulation by future coalitions. Though
certainly stylized, the simple two-party case is illustrative. Moe writes:
[W]hichever party gains a majority of seats in parliament gets to form a
government and, through cohesive voting on policy issues, is in a
position to pass its own program at will. Similarly, should the other party
gain majority status down the road, that party would be able to pass its
own program at will—and, if it wants, to subvert or completely destroy
everything the first party has put in place. . . . This means that formal
340

See Moe, Political Institutions, supra note 191.
Id.
342
See James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and
Why They Do It 297–301 (1989).
343
Moe, Political Institutions, supra note 191, at 241.
341

2013]

PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT

717

structure does not work as a protective strategy—at least, not in the
simple, direct way that it works in a separation-of-powers system.344

Moe’s perspective suggests that bureaucratic drift also does not present the
same risk in parliamentary regimes as it does in separation-of-powers regimes.
Because a ruling coalition in a parliamentary institutional setting is much
more able to act decisively against errant bureaucrats, it is less in need of an ex
ante guard against bureaucratic drift.
It is widely understood that private litigation plays an unusually large role
in policy implementation in the U.S. as compared to a large majority of
345
industrial democratic countries with predominantly parliamentary systems.
This disparity appears significant in relation to the institutional differences
between separation-of-powers and parliamentary systems that we have been
considering. The discussion here suggests the possibility that these
institutional differences are at the root of the twin phenomena of a greater
role for private litigation in American policy implementation (noted by
Kagan), and a more limited and constrained American administrative state
(noted by Wilson), as contrasted with the norm in democratic parliamentary
systems. Focusing partly on separation-of-powers structures as an explanation
for American “adversarial legalism,” Kagan writes, “It is only a slight
oversimplification to say that in the United States lawyers, legal rights, judges,
and lawsuits are the functional equivalent of the large central bureaucracies
346
that dominate governance in high-tax, activist welfare states.”
Interestingly, similar institutional arguments have been marshaled to
explain growing private enforcement (based on the American model, it is
often argued) in the European Union over the past several decades. Over
about the last decade there has been mounting scholarship demonstrating
growing reliance in the EU on regulation though the creation of rights that
347
are privately enforceable in both judicial and administrative fora. This body
of work yields the following set of insights about the growth of private
enforcement in the EU:
x It has been encouraged by decisions of the European Commission,
the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice.
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x

It has spanned the waterfront of policy areas, embracing the
regulatory domains of environmental, anti-trust, securities,
intellectual property, anti-discrimination, and consumer protection
policy, among others.
x It has encouraged reliance upon procedural devices to aggregate
claims and upon economic damages to incentivize private
enforcement.
x It has involved expansion of private enforcement in adjudicatory
venues at the institutional levels of both the EU and its member
states.
Although there has been much talk of the “Americanization” of European
law—with private enforcement being a characteristic frequently attributed to
the American style of legal regulation—no one is arguing that the EU has
converged with the U.S. in the degree of its reliance upon private
enforcement, but only that the degree has increased materially in recent
decades.
There is disagreement about what has caused this development, and in
our discussion of the relationship between political institutions and private
enforcement, we highlight an explanation grounded in political institutions
348
that has been proffered by a number of scholars. Putting aside other rival
349
or supplementary hypotheses, we synthesize the political institutions
explanation as follows: Beginning in the mid-1980s, economic liberalization
in the EU and the push for an integrated market had the gradual effect of
displacing regulatory policymaking from member states to the governing
institutions of the EU. The EU governing structure is highly fragmented,
both vertically (between the EU and member states), and horizontally
(between the EU Council, Parliament, Commission, and Court of Justice).
Such fragmentation hampers the ability of those who make regulatory policy
to effectuate decisive enforcement action, with EU influence upon the distant
and heterogeneous bureaucracies of member states presenting a particular
challenge. The EU government does not have an enforcement bureaucracy
that penetrates the local level, and distrust of remote “Eurocrats” limits the
likelihood that it will develop a strong one in the near future.
This institutional fragmentation, and the impediments that it creates for
effective control by policymakers of an enforcement bureaucracy, may help
to explain growing EU reliance on the alternative of private enforcement.
The development of EU governing structures in Western Europe has
introduced forms of state fragmentation, and public distrust of a far-off
central government, that are familiar in the U.S. One outcome appears to
have been growing reliance on American-style private enforcement, though
surely in muted form.
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Source: Carolyn L. Carter, Consumer Protection in the States: A 50-State Report
on Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices Statutes, 7–10, (2009), National
Consumer Law Center, http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/report_
50_states.pdf. Reprinted with permission of the National Consumer Law
Center.

